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ABSTRACT
HAMILTON B. FOUT: The Role of Labor Market Rigidities in Explaining US
Macroeconomic Behavior
(Under the direction of Michael K. Salemi)
This work investigates the role that labor market rigidities play in the data series implied
by dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models of the US economy. This work
questions and evaluates the increasing reliance by the macroeconomic literature on the Calvo-
style wage rigidity first introduced by Erceg et al. (2000). The baseline case of Calvo wage
stickiness is analyzed and compared with the alternative labor market rigidities of staggered
relative contracting (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a, 1995b), sticky information (Mankiw and Reis
2001a, 2002), and search and matching frictions (Trigari 2004).
The models are compared by their abilities to match the stylized facts and empirical US
evidence as characterized by the impulse response functions (IRFs) resulting from a struc-
tural vector autoregression. The focus here is on policy shocks identified with the short-run
restrictions of Christiano et al. (1999) and technology shocks identified with the long-run
restrictions of Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and Quah (1989). Following the
approach of Christiano et al. (2001, 2005), a subset of the parameters under each specification
of the model is estimated by minimizing the distance between the empirical and model IRFs.
This work extends the current literature by nesting these alternative labor market models for
the first time in a dynamic, nonstationary general equilibrium model that includes technology
growth and can allow for a permanent increase in the level of productivity.
This work offers several conclusions involving the role that alternative labor market rigidi-
ties play in the data series implied by DSGE models of the US economy. First, the sticky
information framework analyzed here improves on the performance of the flexible wage ver-
sion of the model when matching impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, but cannot
improve on the flexible wage version when matching the responses to a long-run technology
iii
shock. Second, the relative staggered contracting specification performs well in matching the
empirical responses of a policy shock and a technology shock when output considerations
are included directly into contract negotiations. Third, both the right-to-manage and Nash
bargaining specifications lose some of their ability to explain labor market behavior and un-
employment when extended and nested in a more general, standard DSGE model. With the
introduction of a procyclical vacancy equation, these search and bargaining frameworks are
able to offer a potential improvement over alternative frameworks through the inclusion of
an extensive margin (number of workers) in the labor market. These results suggest that the
source of the labor market friction has important implications for the behavior of aggregate
macroeconomic variables and thus for the conduct of monetary policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Aggregate wage and price dynamics have been topics of considerable interest in the re-
cent macroeconomic literature. New Keynesian models offer several competing theories of
price-setting behavior in goods and labor markets, each with different consequences for the
behavior of real wages, wage growth and inflation. In the standard New Keynesian dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, Calvo firms (1983) set prices in a staggered,
random fashion leading to a forward-looking Phillips curve in which current inflation depends
positively on the expected future value of inflation and current real marginal cost. The two
major components of marginal cost in the standard DSGE model are the real wage paid to
labor and the rental rate paid to capital. Thus, the specification of the factor markets, in par-
ticular the labor market, crucially affect the model’s implications for the behavior of inflation
and the trade-offs policymakers face.
Although the flexible wage version of the Calvo DSGE model has become a workhorse in
the recent macroeconomic literature, it is a well known result that this standard sticky price
framework is incapable of matching the behavior of macroeconomic variables seen in the US
data.1 Several works have tried to remedy the Calvo specification’s shortcomings by imposing
additional structure on the standard model. Christiano et al. (2001) allow Calvo firms the
ability to index prices to inflation in the intervening periods when they are not permitted to
reoptimize their prices. This introduces lagged inflation into the Phillips curve and corrects
1Here, the standard sticky price Calvo model refers to the version of the model which allows for no indexation
to past aggregate price changes in non-optimizing periods. The extension of price indexation in non-optimizing
periods by Christiano et al. (2001) is discussed below.
the basic Calvo model’s inability to produce empirically observed inflation persistence.2 The
work of Christiano et al. is an extension of both Yun (1996), who assumes that Calvo firms
index prices to steady state inflation when not reoptimizing, and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,
1995b), who introduce the labor market friction of staggered relative contracting to derive a
Phillips curve which contains leads and lags of inflation.
The presence of lagged inflation in the Phillips curve introduces a policy trade-off between
inflation and output stabilization not present in the standard Calvo model. In particular, as
pointed out by Ball (1994), credible disinflations in the Calvo model result in a counterfactual
expansion in output. Mankiw and Reis (2001a) are able to capture this policy trade-off by
replacing the assumption of Calvo price-setting by the firm with the alternative assumption
of sticky information in the firm’s decision-making process. Under the sticky information
framework, firms can reoptimize every period, but the information they use to make decisions
arrives in a staggered, random way. The sticky information version of the model offers a
further improvement over the Calvo model since it can replicate the delayed hump-shaped
response of empirical inflation to a monetary policy shock, while the standard Calvo model
cannot.3
Other problems with the standard flexible wage New Keynesian model arise in its treat-
ment of the labor market and the resulting model behavior of wages and hours. For instance,
in response to an identified monetary policy shock, the real wage is shown empirically in the
current work as well as works such as Christiano et al. (2001, 2005) and Altig et al. (2002,
2005) to be significantly procylical. The model with no labor market rigidities, however, pre-
dicts a counterfactually large initial decline of the real wage in response to a monetary policy
shock due to the fact that with flexible wages, the real wage mechanically equals the marginal
2Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) were the first to criticize the failure of the forward-looking Phillips curve to
produce the empirically observed level of inflation persistence. Fuhrer and Moore used the term “persistence”
to describe the sustained and slowly dying univariate autocorrelation function relating inflation and its own
lags and the sustained and slowly dying autocorrelation function relating inflation and past values of output.
In this work, I use the term persistence to refer to a slowly adjusting, long-lived response of a variable away
from its steady state.
3Mankiw and Reis (2006a) extend the sticky information specification to the labor market and assume that
households must set wages based on randomly updated information. Section 4 of the current work explores
this labor market rigidity further.
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rate of substitution which falls because hours fall. Beginning with Erceg et al. (2000) the
literature has sought to drive a wedge between the real wage and the marginal rate of substi-
tution in the baseline New Keynesian DSGE Model. Erceg et al. extend the ideas of Calvo
price-setting to the labor market, assuming that households supply labor in a monopolistically
competitive way and have a random, staggered opportunity to set wages. The inclusion of
sticky wages also has ramifications for the conduct of optimal monetary policy and the trade-
offs policymakers face. In fact, the primary purpose of Erceg et al. (2000) is to show that the
introduction of wage stickiness changes the optimal approach to monetary policy in the New
Keynesian model. In particular, they show that wage stickiness implies a trade-off between
the policy goals of inflation and output stabilization. Thus, with Calvo-style wage rigidities,
a labor market channel for the transmission of monetary policy emerges in the standard New
Keynesian model.
An alternative labor market friction that predates the use of Calvo wage-setting involves
the use of staggered contracts. Fischer (1977) introduces a model of long-term contracts in
order to explain that monetary policy can affect real output, even when rational expectations
are taken into account. Fischer assumes a staggered contracting framework, in which different
groups of workers set wages in different periods. The nominal wage is set in an attempt to
maintain constancy in the real wage. In any given period, there are multiple contracts in play,
each set at different times in the past. With a portion of nominal wages fixed under contract,
when policymakers change inflation by altering the money supply, they can also affect the
real wage and output.
Taylor (1980) uses an overlapping contract model to explain how macroeconomic distur-
bances can lead to persistent movements in output and unemployment. In the Taylor model
firms and unions set contracts specifying a fixed nominal wage to be in play over the life of
the contract. This wage is set to equal an average measure of other wages from the past and
expected wages in the future that either currently exist or will exist in other contracts over
the life of the current contract. This model displays inertia in prices and wages, and thus
in the real wage and output. The Taylor model predates the sticky price Calvo model but
results in a Phillips curve relationship that is similar to that of the Calvo model, in which
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inflation is a function of future expected inflation and current output. Thus, the Taylor model
is subject to the same criticisms as the baseline Calvo model discussed above.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) criticize Taylor’s model for its inability to account for inflation
persistence and for its lack of a policy trade-off between inflation and output stabilization.
These are exactly two of the weaknesses of the Calvo model of price stickiness described
above. To improve on the Taylor model’s shortcomings, Fuhrer and Moore propose a model
of staggered real wage bargaining in which agents set real contract prices as an average of
current and expected future real contract prices that either currently exist or are expected to
exist over the life of the current contract. This model displays not only persistence in prices
and wages but also in inflation. Thus the model offer the same benefits of the Taylor model
along with the additional contributions of inflation persistence and a policy trade-off between
output and inflation stabilization. This policy trade-off, similar to Christiano et al. (2001),
arises from the lagged inflation term in the Phillips curve. When inflation depends on its
past values as well as its future expected value and a real driving term, it is not possible to
simultaneously stabilize output and inflation in the model.
Another alternative labor market friction involves the application of sticky information to
the labor market first introduced by Mankiw and Reis (2001b). Under the sticky information
assumption, wage-setters face a fixed probability of updating their information set each period,
and thus must make some decisions based on expectations of current economic conditions
formed from past information. Mankiw and Reis (2001b) model wages as a linear function
of prices, productivity and employment. With wages assumed to take on this specific form,
Mankiw and Reis show that sticky information in the labor market can explain much of the
postwar behavior of US inflation. Koenig (2004), Mankiw and Reis (2006a) and Mankiw
and Reis (2006b) present more microfounded versions of sticky information labor markets
within DSGE models. In these papers, the presence of sticky information introduces a policy
trade-off between output and inflation stabilization and also allows for inequality between the
marginal rate of substitution and the real wage.
Trigari (2004) relies on the alternative friction of search and bargaining in the labor market
in order to explain equilibrium unemployment and to allow for fluctuations in the number of
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workers employed, two empirical features the Calvo model, even with sticky wages, cannot
explain. Trigari’s model is an extension of earlier work by Andolfatto (1996) and Cheron
and Langot (2000). Andolfatto shows that the search and bargaining model in a general
equilibrium framework can better match the empirical dynamic behavior of hours, wages
and output growth than a flexible wage model. Cheron and Langot show that the search
and bargaining model helps explain the empirically observed negative correlations between
inflation and unemployment embodied in the original formulations of the Phillips curve and
between vacancies and unemployment in the Beveridge curve relationship. Under the search
and bargaining model, unemployed workers search for jobs and hiring firms post vacancies.
It takes time for suitable matches to form, providing a mechanism for slow adjustment in
the labor market. Once a match is formed, workers and firms bargain over wages and hours.
In general, this bargaining process causes the real wage to differ from the marginal rate of
substitution, another potential improvement over the flexible wage version of the Calvo model.
Despite the existence and potentially meaningful contribution of these theories of staggered
bargaining, sticky information and search and bargaining, the macroeconomic literature has
seen an increasing dominance in the use of the Calvo wage-setting rigidity within the DSGE
framework. A selection of examples of works in the literature that have included this type
of friction in the labor market include Christiano et al. (2005), Del Negro et al. (2004),
Smets and Wouters (2002), Altig et al. (2002, 2005) and Givens (2005). The current work
questions and evaluates this growing reliance by the macroeconomic literature on the Calvo-
style rigidity of Erceg et al. (2000). The baseline case of Calvo wage stickiness is analyzed
and compared with the alternative labor market rigidities of staggered relative contracting
(Fuhrer and Moore 1995a, 1995b), sticky information (Mankiw and Reis 2006a), and search
and matching frictions (Trigari 2004) within a fully-specified DSGE framework.
The labor market models are compared by their abilities to match the stylized facts and
empirical evidence in the US data. The primary means of characterizing the data is through
the use of impulse response functions (IRFs) resulting from a structural vector autoregression.
The focus here is on the responses to policy shocks in the form of unexpected increases in
the central bank’s target for the short-term rate of interest and technology shocks in the
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form of permanent increases in the level of labor productivity. This work follows the growing
tradition of other macroeconomic works that use impulse responses to structural shocks to
characterize and summarize empirical and model behavior, including Altig et al. (2002, 2005),
Christiano et al. (1999, 2001, 2005), Edge et al. (2003), Francis and Ramey (2002, 2005),
Gali (1999), Hall et al. (2007), Jorda and Kozicki (2005), Rossi (2007) and Trigari (2004).4
Following the approach of Christiano et al. (2001, 2005), a subset of the parameters under
each specification of the model is estimated by minimizing the distance between the empirical
and model IRFs. In this sense, the impulse responses reported for each model represent
an optimal performance for each model and not just a response resulting from a possibly
arbitrary collection of parameter values.
This work provides both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the field of macro-
economics. Theoretically, this work extends the current literature by nesting the alternative
frameworks of sticky information, staggered bargaining and search and bargaining for the
first time in a fully specified dynamic, nonstationary general equilibrium model that includes
technology growth and offers the macro researcher a way to distinguish and compare the
alternative labor market frictions. The nonstationarity arising from the unit root process of
technology in the model makes it possible to examine permanent increases to productivity
within the model. For each rigidity only the labor market is changed, while the remaining
structure of the general equilibrium model is preserved across labor market specifications.
Empirically, this work extends the macroeconomic literature by providing estimates for a
subset of each of the labor market model’s structural parameters using the minimum distance
estimation approach of Christiano et al. (2001, 2005). This is the first work that estimates the
parameters of the sticky information, staggered contracting and search and bargaining models
in this way. This approach to parameter estimation also potentially provides a framework in
which to do model selection and choose between competing labor market models on empirical
grounds.
This work offers several conclusions involving the role that alternative labor market rigidi-
4Sims (1996) argues for this approach writing, “orthogonal decompositions of time series data (like vector
autoregression impulse responses) ought to be a standard part of evaluating real business cycle models.”
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ties play in the data series implied by DSGE models of the US economy. First, the sticky
information framework analyzed here improves on the performance of the flexible wage ver-
sion of the model when matching impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, but cannot
improve on the flexible wage version when matching the responses to a long-run technology
shock. Second, the relative staggered contracting specification performs well in matching the
empirical responses of a policy shock and a technology shock when output considerations
are included directly into contract negotiations. Third, both the right-to-manage and Nash
bargaining specifications lose some of their ability to explain labor market behavior and un-
employment when extended and nested in a more general, standard DSGE model. With the
introduction of a procyclical vacancy equation, these search and bargaining frameworks are
able to offer a potential improvement over alternative frameworks through the inclusion of an
extensive margin (number of workers) in the labor market.
The rest of this work proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes the US data and presents the
stylized facts for the US economy with a focus on aggregate labor market behavior. Chapter
3 presents the basic structure of the standard Calvo-style labor market specification in the
context of the New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model used in the current work.
Chapters 4 – 6 nest the alternative labor market rigidities of sticky information, staggered
contracting and search and bargaining, respectively, within the standard New Keynesian
model of Chapter 3 and analyze their dynamic behaviors. Chapter 7 presents evidence and
discussion of model selection, and Chapter 8 concludes and discusses possible extensions of
the current work.
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Chapter 2
US Economic Behavior
2.1 US Data
This chapter characterizes aggregate US business cycle behavior over the past 40 years
with a focus on inflation, output and the labor market variables of wage growth, real wages,
labor productivity and hours. The primary means of characterizing the data is through
the use of impulse response functions (IRFs) to identified monetary policy and long-run
permanent technology shocks resulting from a structural vector autoregression (VAR). The
VAR is estimated with quarterly US macroeconomic data from the period 1965 to 2004.1
The output measure used in the generation of the IRFs is real output for the nonfarm
business sector.2 The measure for wages used here is the corresponding measure of hourly
compensation for the nonfarm business sector. The price measure is the implicit price deflator
for GDP. Price and wage inflation are both calculated as the log difference of the respective
level series.3 The federal funds rate is used as the interest rate. The price inflation and interest
1All data used in this paper come from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database except for the hours
and population series which come from Francis and Ramey (2005) and the unemployment series which comes
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2Real GDP was also used to generate the consumption share and the investment share series used in some
of the data analysis below.
3Although, the empirical wage inflation series appears in the analysis of this section, it is not actually used
in the estimation of the VAR, since collinearity problems would arise if wage inflation, real wage and inflation
data were all used. Instead, only the latter two are included in the VAR. In order to generate IRFs for the
wage inflation series the definition pˆiw,t ≡ wˆrt − wˆrt−1 + 0.25pˆit + zt is used. Here, pˆiw,t is the demeaned net
wage inflation series, pˆit is the demeaned net price inflation, wˆ
r
t is the log-linearized real wage series, and 
z
t is
the technology shock.
rate series are in annual percentage terms, and the wage inflation series is in quarterly terms.
The real consumption and real investment series are the same as used in Edge et al. (2003)
and Altig et al. (2002, 2005), with the consumption series calculated as the sum of personal
consumption of nondurables and services plus government consumption, and the investment
series calculated as the sum of personal consumption of durable goods plus gross private
investment plus government investment.
The unemployment measure used is the BLS 16 years of age and over civilian unemploy-
ment rate. The hours and population series used come from Francis and Ramey (2005).4 The
manufacturing capacity utilization index is used as the measure of capital utilization. The
consumption, investment, output and hours series are put in per capita terms by dividing by
the population series.5
Following Edge at al. (2003) and Altig et al. (2005), this work relies on the use of cointe-
grating vectors to make the data stationary as opposed to linearly or quadratically detrending
the series, for example. The use of cointegrating relationships ensures that the long-run rela-
tionships and shared trends of the variables implied by the model are respected and preserved
in the estimation of the VAR and the generation of IRFs. This approach also allows for the
use of long-run restrictions to identify structural shocks in the VAR framework and for the
straightforward recovery of the level of the original data series’ impulse responses from their
stationary transformations’ impulse responses.
2.2 Cointegrated Relationship Approach
Several works in the recent macroeconomic literature exploit cointegrating relationships
implied by a theoretical model of the economy to generate stationary data series. Examples
of this approach in the literature include Christiano et al. (2001, 2005), Altig et al. (2002,
2005) and Edge et al. (2003). Under this approach, the economic model implies certain
4Francis and Ramey filter the standard nonfarm business hours and population data to remove some of the
slow moving demographic changes in these series which can lead to some possible unit root-like behavior in
the bounded per capita hours series.
5The interest rate and inflation series were initially in monthly terms. They were made into quarterly series
by sampling them at a quarterly frequency.
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equilibrium relationships between variables. For instance, abstracting from trade and the
government sector, the aggregate resource constraint states that Yt = Ct + It. In the data,
output, consumption and investment are all nonstationary series. These variables are linked
together theoretically, however, by this aggregate resource constraint. Thus, although output
may be growing through time, it should on average be growing roughly at the same rate as
investment and consumption. Under the theory that consumption, investment and output
share a common trend, the ratio Ct/Yt is trend stationary. Logging this ratio should result in
the stationary series ct − yt, where lowercase variables represent the log of the corresponding
level series. If, in this case, premultiplying the vector (ct, yt)′ by the vector (1,−1) results in
a stationary series, then the vector (1,−1) is referred to as a cointegrating vector for (ct, yt)′.
Relying on this approach, the nonstationary raw data variables can be combined using insight
from the theoretical model presented in the next chapter of this paper to obtain cointegrating
vectors and thus stationary series.6 According to Altig et al. (2005) and Edge et al. (2003),
the following data vector should be stationary:7
Y ∗t = (∆(ym,t − l∗t ), pit, ukt , ym,t − l∗t − wrt , l∗t , ct − yt, invt − yt, rt)′ (2.1)
Here, ym,t is the log of per capita real nonfarm business output, l∗t is the log of per capita
hours series used by Edge et al. (2003), pit is the log difference of the GDP deflator, ukt is the
log of the manufacturing capacity utilization index, wrt is the log of the real wage, yt is the
log of real GDP, ct is the log of real consumption, invt is the log of real investment, ut is the
6Estimating a VAR containing variables that are made stationary in this way by relying on cointegrating
relationships allows for the preservation of information that is lost when using other more brute-force detrending
methods like linear, quadratic or Hodrick-Prescott detrending of the individual series. The advantage of
this approach also lies in its multivariate approach to detrending that respects the joint behavior of the
variables implied by the model, a joint behavior ignored by univariate detrending methods. Using model-
implied cointegrating relationships to make data stationary also allows for the use of long-run identification
restrictions to identify a technology shock since this approach preserves the VAR variables in a form where it
makes sense to talk about permanent increases in these variables. This would not make sense when a variable
has been demeaned/detrended.
7As Edge et al. (2003) point out, this VAR contains a slight inconsistency in that the responses of ct and
invt are calculated by adding the response of ym,t to the responses of ct − yt and inct − yt, respectively.
Treating the consumption and investment shares this way is necessary, however, because the measures of ct
and invt contain goods that are not contained in ym,t. The responses ym,t and w
r
t series can be calculated in
a similar fashion from the VAR variable’s impulse responses.
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unemployment rate, and rt is the net federal funds rate.8
Table 2.1 reports the results from augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root nonstation-
arity in each of the data series using the exact same data employed by Edge et al. (2003). The
Edge et al. data is quarterly and comes from the period 1960 through 2001.9 According to
the theoretical models presented in the later sections of this paper, these empirical variables,
in some cases obtained by pre-multiplication of a data vector by a cointegrating vector as dis-
cussed above, should be stationary and without a trend. Thus, the augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests are conducted with a constant, no trend and the number of lagged difference terms
chosen using the Akaike information criteria. The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be
rejected for the pit, l∗t , ct − yt and rt series at the five percent significance level.
The data used in this work differs from the Edge et al. (2003) data along three dimensions.
First, the data used here involves the additional years of 2002-2004. Second, different and
additional data series are used here compared with Edge et al. The hours and population
series used here comes from Francis and Ramey (2005), while Edge et al. use nonfarm business
hours and civilian population over the age of 16. Also, the current work uses unemployment
data, a variable not included in Edge et al. Finally, even when the data used involves the
same series and dates, the observations can differ due to data revisions occurring between
2001 and 2005.
Between the time of the data collection of Edge et al. and the current work, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) made annual revisions each July for the years 2002–2004 and
a benchmark revision in 2003. With the annual revisions, the BEA revises the most recent
three years of national income and product data. For instance with the 2005 annual revision,
as explained by Fernald and Wang (2005), inflation rates in 2002, 2003 and 2004 were revised
upward. In addition to the annual revisions, the BEA also undertakes benchmark revisions
8Edge et al. (2003) and Altig et al. (2002, 2005) use a different hours and population series than the one
used in the current work. Thus, the Edge et al. and Altig et al. hours measure is denoted by l∗t and the
corresponding data vector is denoted Y ∗t , while the hours measure used in the current work is denoted lt and
the corresponding data vector is denoted Yt.
9Edge et al. (2003) and Altig et al. (2002, 2005) also include velocity in their sets of variables. I exclude
velocity since it is not explicitly accounted for among the variables in the New Keynesian model presented in
this work.
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approximately every five years, which involve changes in definitions and classifications. One
part of the benchmark revision of 2003 involved changes in the composition of national income
resulting from the inclusion of a broader set of incomes used in production.10 To see how
significant the annual and benchmark revisions to the data are, I gather the same data series
used by Edge et al. after the revisions and compare it with their pre-revised data. Figure
2.1 plots the macroeconomic data both before and after the revisions. The plots show that
for the most part, the data before and after revision are very similar. There are differences,
however, for instance between the productivity growth and inflation series before and after
the revision. The productivity growth series after revision is more volatile than its pre-revised
counterpart, while the pre-revised inflation data shows a dip at the end of 2001, even going
slightly negative, while the revised data shows no such decline.
To check the effect of the revisions on the stationarity of the transformed data series,
Table 2.2 reports augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for the revised data. These results
are similar to the pre-revised data results, with pit, l∗t , ct − yt and rt all again displaying
evidence of nonstationarity. To check how the addition of observations from 2002–2004 affect
the stationary of the data, Table 2.3 reports the augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for the
revised data including the additional observations from these years. Again pit, l∗t , ct−yt and rt
display possible nonstationarity, but now with the addition of these observations, ym,t−l∗t−wrt
also displays possible unit root behavior.
The final difference between the Edge et al. data and the data used in this paper is that
there are additional and alternative series used here compared with Edge et al. I use the
alternative hours and population series of Francis and Ramey (2005), who remove the slow-
moving components of government employment, schooling, and aging to create their data
series. As Francis and Ramey explain, these measures of hours and population are preferred
because these slow-moving components lead to distortion in unit root tests of hours and
also because these measures of hours and population come closer to the model-generated
counterparts of the DSGE models frequently encountered in the literature and analyzed here.
The hours measure of Francis and Ramey and used here is denoted as lt. I also include
10For a comprehensive look at the benchmark revision of 2003 see Seskin and Larkins (2004).
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unemployment ut, a variable not used by Edge et al. The primary reason for including
unemployment is to capture movements in the labor input at both the intensive (number
of hours) margin and the extensive (number of workers) margin. The ability to explain
the extensive margin of the labor market offers a potential way to distinguish between the
alternative theories of the labor market presented in the next few chapters. The search and
bargaining frameworks of Chapter 6 can explain the extensive margin and the responses of
unemployment, while the other labor market frameworks analyzed in this work cannot. With
unemployment in the VAR, empirical responses of unemployment to policy and technology
shocks can be calculated, and these empirical responses can be compared with the responses
implied by the alternative labor market theories.
Table 2.4 reports the results from augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root nonstation-
arity in each of the data series used in this work. Again the hypothesis of nonstationarity
cannot be rejected for pit, ct − yt, rt and ym,t − lt − wrt . In addition, ut also displays possible
nonstationarity. The hours series of Francis and Ramey (2005) does, in contrast to the hours
series used by Edge et al. display stationarity. This table also provides evidence that the
series ct − yt and ym,t − lt − wrt are not cointegrated of the order implied by the model.11
To test this, I first conduct augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the original data series to
look for evidence that each is integrated of order one. Next I estimate the cointegrating vectors
for the data pairs (ym,t−lt, wrt ), (ct, yt) and (invt, yt) and test whether the cointegrating vectors
in each case could be (1,−1), as implied by the model. Finally, I calculate the transformed
data series resulting from the estimated cointegrated vectors and test whether these are
stationary by conducting augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the errors from the regression.12
Table 2.5 reports the results of this analysis.
The results suggest that at a five percent significance level, each of the original series
is integrated of order one, there is evidence that the cointegrating vectors in each case are
11In order for variables x1t and x
2
t to be cointegrated of order (d,b), they first must each be integrated of
order d, and there must exist a 1× 2 vector γ such that γ(x1t , x2t )′ is integrated of order d− b.
12For instance, for the data pair (ct, yt), I estimate the regression ct = β
c
0+β
c
1yt+e
c
t , test the null hypothesis
that βc1 = 1 and run an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the variable e
c
t which should be stationary if (1,−βc1)
is a cointegrating vector for (ct, yt)
′. As explained by Stock (1987), if ct and yt are cointegrated, the coefficient
βc1 will be superconsistent.
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different from (1,−1) and that using the estimated cointegrating vectors makes the resulting
series in each case stationary. Thus, for the analysis in this paper, I generate the stationary
variables implied by the estimated cointegrating vectors.13 Thus in order to estimate the
VAR, generate impulse response functions to characterize the data and arrive at a set of
stylized facts for the US economy, I use the following data vector:14
Yt = (∆(ym,t − lt), pit, ukt , ym,t − lt − βyh1 wrt , lt, ct − βc1yt, it − βi1yt, ut, rt)′, (2.2)
where βyh1 is the coefficient on the real wage in the productivity regression, β
c
1 is the coefficient
on output in the consumption regression, and βi1 is the coefficient on output in the investment
regression.
2.3 VAR Specification and Identification
I estimate a VAR from the US data and identify two types of shocks – monetary policy
and technology shocks. The structural VAR takes on the general form:
A0Yt = µ+A(L)Yt−1 + t (2.3)
The term structural VAR is used here to denote theoretical restrictions placed on the
structures of A0 and A(L), which in this paper include short-run restrictions to identify the
policy shock and long-run restrictions to simultaneously identify technology shocks. Here,
Yt is an (n × 1) vector containing the current observations of the n data variables, with
productivity growth ordered first and the interest rate ordered last. The lag polynomial
A(L) represents the n× n coefficient matrices of the VAR(p), and µ represents the vector of
intercept terms. Identification of the structural components of the error terms t is achieved
by making restrictions on A0 and A(L).
13Others in the literature including Muller and Watson (2006) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) have also
found evidence that the cointegrating vector for consumption and output is not (1,−1).
14I allow the inflation, unemployment and interest rates to enter in levels despite the evidence reported in
Table 2.4 of possible non-stationarity, holding on to the theoretical models’ assumptions that these variables
are stationary.
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The approach used to identify the policy shock relies on the short-run recursiveness as-
sumption outlined by Christiano et al. (1999). Under this approach, the interest rate is
assumed to respond contemporaneously to all other aggregate variables but affect the other
variables only with a lag. In other words, the policy shock is assumed to be orthogonal to
all other variables in the policymaker’s information set. Identification is achieved using an
ordering assumption in which the interest rate is ordered after all other variables in the VAR.
As Christiano et al (1999) point out, if no structural interpretation is attached to the
disturbance terms in t ordered before the interest rate, this identification scheme can be
achieved by assuming that A0 takes on a lower-triangular form. If this is the case, the VAR
can be estimated using an instrumental variable approach in which each of the equations
is estimated using the error terms contained in t from the previously ordered equations
to instrument for the previously ordered variable. Since each equation uses a common set of
lagged regressors and a constant, the information in the previous error term is the only unique
information embodied in the previously ordered variables.15 The IV approach is used here
since it can be incorporated to simultaneously implement short-run and long-run restrictions,
such as necessary to jointly identify policy and technology shocks.
In order to identify the long-run technology shock and estimate the first row of A0, I follow
the approach used by Gali (1999), Francis and Ramey (2002), Altig et al. (2002, 2005), Francis
et al. (2003) and Edge et al. (2003) among others. This approach uses the restriction that
the only shock able to affect the level of labor productivity in the long run is the technology
shock and is implemented using the IV approach outlined in Shapiro and Watson (1988) and
Francis et al. (2003). Equation (2.3) can be demeaned and written as
A0Yˆt = A(L)Yˆt−1 + t, (2.4)
where Yˆt = Yt − E(Yt).16 This equation can be rewritten as
15Alternatively and identically, identification can be achieved using a reduced form VAR with the same
ordering as above, except with A0 set equal to the identity matrix and a Choleski decomposition of the error
covariance matrix used to premultiply the reduced-form errors of the VAR.
16To arrive at this equation, notice that (2.3) implies that µ = (A0 −A(L))E(Yt). Subtracting µ from both
sides, leads to (2.4).
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Yˆt = (A0 −A(L))−1t = C(L)t (2.5)
The long-run restriction that only the technology shock, the first element in t, can per-
manently affect the level of productivity implies that all of the elements in the first row of
C(1) other than the first column are zero. This also means that all of the elements in the
first row of A0 −A(1) other than the first column are zero. Under the approach explained in
Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Francis et al. (2003), the equation contained in the first row
of (2.3) can be written as
∆(ym,t − lt) =
p∑
j=1
α1,j∆(ym,t−j − ht−j) +
n∑
i=2
p∑
j=0
αi,jYi,t−j + zt , (2.6)
where ∆(ym,t−lt) is the growth in productivity, Yi,t is the variable in row i of Yt, αi,j represents
the coefficient on lag j of the variable Yi,t with αn,0 = 0, and zt is the structural technology
shock. Equation (2.6) can be rewritten as
∆(ym,t − lt) =
p∑
j=1
α1,j∆(ym,t−j − ht−j) +
n∑
i=2
(αi,0Yi,t + αi,1Yi,t−1 + . . .+ αi,pYi,t−p) + zt
=
p∑
j=1
α1,j∆(ym,t−j − ht−j)
+
n∑
i=2
(αi,0(Yi,t − Yi,t−1) + (αi,0 + αi,1)(Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2)) + . . .
+
n∑
i=2
(αi,0 + αi,1 + . . . αi,p−1)(Yi,t−p+1 − Yi,t−p)
+
n∑
i=2
(αi,0 + αi,1 + . . . αi,p−1 + αi,p)(Yi,t−p) + zt (2.7)
The long-run restriction discussed above that all of the elements other than the first
column of the first row of A0−A(1) are equal to zero implies that (αi,0+αi,1+. . . αi,p−1+αi,p) =
0 for i = 2, ..., n. This is because the first row of A(0)−A(1) can be written as
16
[A0 −A(1))](1,1)...(1,p) =
1 , − p∑
j=1
α1,j , . . . , −
p∑
j=0
αp,j
 (2.8)
Imposing the long-run restriction, (2.7) can be rewritten as
∆(ym,t − lt) =
p∑
j=1
α1,j∆(ym,t−j − ht−j) +
n∑
i=2
(αi,0∆Yi,t + (αi,0 + αi,1)∆Yi,t−1 + . . .
+
n∑
i=2
(αi,0 + αi,1 + . . .+ αi,p−1)∆Yi,t−p+1 + zt
=
p∑
j=1
α1,j∆(ym,t−j − ht−j) +
n∑
i=2
p−1∑
j=0
α˜i,j∆Yi,t−j + zt , (2.9)
where the α˜i,j are functions of the underlying αi,j as given in (2.9). This equation is estimated
by using an instrumental variable approach under which predicted values obtained from re-
gressions on lagged values are used to instrument for the contemporaneous right-hand side
values to avoid simultaneity bias. The structural error zt in this equation is calculated by
substituting the actual contemporaneous values for the instruments back into the estimated
version of (2.9). This error is then fed in to all successive equations in (2.3) as an instrument
for ∆(ym,t − lt). The elements of t are generated by replacing the instruments with the ac-
tual variables that they are instrumenting for in each equation and calculating the resulting
residual. The interest rate equation, because of the short-run recursiveness assumption, can
be estimated with simple ordinary least squares using current values of all of the previously
ordered variables and p lags of all of the elements in Yt. Once (2.3) is estimated and the
structural shocks identified, impulse responses characterizing the data can be calculated.
The estimated system of equations given by (2.4) can be rewritten as
Yˆt = A0−1A(L)Yˆt−1 +A0−1t. (2.10)
The interest rate shock corresponds to an unanticipated one percent increase in the annualized
nominal interest rate. In this case, the initial value of the shock is equal to the inverse of the
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element from the last row and column of A0−1. This results in an initial one percent increase
in the nominal rate of interest that, because of the ordering assumption, only affects the
other variables of the VAR with a lag.17 The technology shock corresponds to a permanent
one percent increase in the level of labor productivity. In order to implement this shock, the
long-run effect of the shock can be determined by setting the lag operator L equal to one and
rewriting the long-run version of (2.4) as
Yˆt = (A0 −A(1))−1t. (2.11)
Since the long-run responses of the demeaned variables in Yˆt in equation (2.11) can be
interpreted as cumulative sums of the effect of the shocks in t, the long-run response of the
first difference of the log of labor productivity can be interpreted as a permanent change in
the detrended level of labor productivity.18 The initial value of the technology shock is set
equal to the inverse of the element in the first row and column of (A0−A(1))−1. This ensures
that the permanent effect of a technology shock is to raise the level of labor productivity by
one percent.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the impulse responses and confidence bands implied by the
estimated VAR to an unexpected one percent increase in the annual federal funds rate and to
a permanent increase in the level of productivity, respectively. The solid lines represent the
actual impulse response function and the dashed lines represent the one standard deviation
confidence bands.19 The confidence bands are generated using a bootstrap procedure to draw
with replacement from the errors of the estimated VAR 500 times and regenerate the data
series. The resulting data series are then used to reestimate the VAR and recompute the
17In order to generate the responses of the variables to an annual interest rate shock, the responses of the
real variables in the VAR to the policy shock are divided by four. The remaining responses of the nominal
interest rate, the inflation rate and the wage inflation rate are not transformed in this way and are thus kept
in annual terms.
18To see this, notice that the cumulative sum of the first difference in a variable xt can be written as
(xt − xt−1) + (xt−1 − xt−2) + . . . + (x1 − x0) = (xt − x0). If xt is in logs, this difference corresponds to the
long-run percentage change.
19One standard deviation bands are used here to enable comparisons with the results reported by others in
the literature such as Edge et al. (2003) and Gali et al. (2005) and correspond to 68.2 % confidence bands.
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impulse responses. The variances and covariances for the impulse responses, and thus the
confidence bands, can be calculated directly from these resulting impulse responses.
The IRFs for the policy shock reflect the standard results that following an unexpected
increase, the interest rate stays positive for an extended time and returns to zero after about
two years. Output follows a hump-shaped pattern with a peak response about a year after
the shock and dies out after three years. The responses that capture the factor inputs used in
the production of output – capital utilization and hours – and the components of the demand
for output – consumption and investment – all follow this same hump-shaped pattern. The
response of inflation starts out insignificantly positive, then displays a persistent decline,
becoming significantly negative after about two years and staying negative even after five
years.
The unemployment rate follows a positive hump-shaped path, while the real wage displays
a significant negative response, staying negative for the entire duration of the experiment.20
The labor productivity series, calculated as the excess of the output response over the hours
response, follows a similar hump-shaped pattern to that of output. The wage inflation series,
like the inflation series, also responds negatively.
The IRFs for the technology shock that results in a permanent one percent increase in
the level of labor productivity reveal long-lived, positive responses of output, consumption,
investment, the real wage and productivity. The initial effect of this permanent shock is to
drive up the level of labor productivity as well as these other real variables. Productivity,
however, initially only increases by about half of its total long run response, which is con-
strained to be equal to unity under the identification scheme of the technology shock discussed
above. This pattern of initially partial and slowly-increasing response is also reflected in out-
put, consumption, investment and the real wage. The unemployment and hours series both
reach their peak after five quarters before eventually dying out. The effect at impact of the
technology shock on hours is insignificantly negative. The response of hours to technology
shocks has been a controversial issue in the recent macroeconomic literature. The evidence
20When compared with Edge et al. (2003), the response of real wages is in the same direction, but the Edge
et al. response is insignificant. The real wage responses reported by Altig et al. (2002, 2005), however, are
prolonged and significant.
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presented here supports the results of Gali (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2002) that hours
respond negatively (or insignificantly) on impact of a permanent increase in technology.
Inflation in response to a technology shock displays an immediate and significant nega-
tive response lasting about two years. Wage inflation reveals an initially large and signifi-
cant positive response as nominal wages dramatically increase on impact of the shock and a
subsequently erratic pattern of brief insignificant positive and negative values. The capital
utilization response follows a similar shaped pattern as reported by Edge et al. but unlike
the significantly negative response reported by Edge et al. the response here begins with
a slightly significant negative value and never becomes significantly positive. Another key
empirical fact involves the initial response of productivity to a technology shock. This initial
response of productivity has a non-zero variance associated with it, since the initial value of
the shock is constrained to increase the long-run level of labor productivity by one percent.
Each draw of the error matrix in the bootstrap procedure used to generate the confidence
bands for the responses implies different estimated parameter values in (2.11) and thus dif-
ferent initial values for the technology shock and its initial impact on productivity.21 This
initial variance should be contrasted with the initial lack of variance for all variable responses
after a policy shock. This occurs because the initial one percent increase in the interest rate
is contemporaneously orthogonal to the responses of all other variables which remain at zero.
The key empirical facts arising from the US data can be summarized as follows. First,
there is equilibrium unemployment present in the data, and the responses of unemployment
exhibit a countercyclical, long-lived and significant hump-shaped response to both a policy
and a technology shock.22 Second, hours display hump-shaped responses to both policy and
technology shocks. After a policy shock, the response of hours is immediately negative and
sustained, while after a technology shock, the response is insignificant for a few quarters before
becoming slightly significantly positive. Third, inflation’s response to a technology shock is
21Edge et al. (2003) report a zero variance for the initial response of productivity, despite claiming that the
shock is identified by assuming that it increases the long-run level of labor productivity by one percent. If this
was the identification scheme assumed, then there should be a variance associated with the initial response of
productivity.
22The intercept term for the unemployment series in the VAR is 0.056, implying an equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate of 5.6 percent.
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immediately negative before quickly returning to equilibrium, while its response to a policy
shock follows a hump-shaped pattern. As pointed out by Edge et al. (2003), this indicates
that following a technology shock inflation displays little inertia, while following a policy
shock it displays a large amount of inertia, either intrinsic or arising from persistent behavior
in marginal costs. Fourth, both the real wage and labor productivity respond procyclically
to both shocks. Finally, the response of wage inflation after a policy shock is persistent and
negative. These are the empirical facts that the labor market specifications of Chapters 3–
6 will be asked to match. The next chapter begins the theoretical economic analysis with
the introduction of the New Keynesian DSGE model and the baseline Calvo sticky wage
specification of the labor market.
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Table 2.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics for Edge, Laubach and Williams (2003)
Data (1960 - 2001, Quarterly) with Constant and No Trend
Var Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Diff Stat
∆(ym,t − l∗t ) 1 -13.397 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
pit 1 -2.789 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ukt 1 -3.779 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ym,t − l∗t − wrt 1 -3.045 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
l∗t 1 -2.391 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ct − yt 0 -1.779 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
invt − yt 1 -2.943 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
rt 0 -2.734 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
Note: The first column of the table contains the data variables,
the second column provides the number of lagged differences in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test as chosen by the Akaike information
criteria, the third column presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistic, and the last three columns provide the critical values for
the Dickey-Fuller test at the one, five and ten percent levels. If
the test statistic is greater in absolute value than the critical value,
then the researcher can conclude that there is evidence that the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the data series can be rejected at the
corresponding level of significance.
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Table 2.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics for Revised Edge, Laubach and Williams
(2003) Data (1960 - 2001, Quarterly) with Constant and No Trend
Var Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Diff Stat
∆(ym,t − l∗t ) 1 -12.964 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
pit 1 -2.410 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ukt 1 -3.587 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ym,t − l∗t − wrt 1 -2.902 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
l∗t 1 -2.441 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ct − yt 0 -1.805 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
invt − yt 1 -3.031 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
rt 0 -2.734 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
Note: The first column of the table contains the data variables,
the second column provides the number of lagged differences in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test as chosen by the Akaike information
criteria, the third column presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistic, and the last three columns provide the critical values for
the Dickey-Fuller test at the one, five and ten percent levels. If
the test statistic is greater in absolute value than the critical value,
then the researcher can conclude that there is evidence that the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the data series can be rejected at the
corresponding level of significance.
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Table 2.3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics for Revised, Extended Edge, Laubach and
Williams (2003) Data (1960 - 2004, Quarterly) with Constant and No Trend
Var Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Diff Stat
∆(ym,t − l∗t ) 0 -13.281 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
pit 1 -2.541 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ukt 1 -3.799 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ym,t − l∗t − wrt 0 -2.851 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
l∗t 1 -2.521 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ct − yt 0 -1.449 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
invt − yt 1 -3.159 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
rt 0 -2.642 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
Note: The first column of the table contains the data variables,
the second column provides the number of lagged differences in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test as chosen by the Akaike information
criteria, the third column presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistic, and the last three columns provide the critical values for
the Dickey-Fuller test at the one, five and ten percent levels. If
the test statistic is greater in absolute value than the critical value,
then the researcher can conclude that there is evidence that the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the data series can be rejected at the
corresponding level of significance.
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Table 2.4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics for Alternative, Updated Data (1960 -
2004, Quarterly) with Constant and No Trend
Var Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Diff Stat
∆(ym,t − lt) 1 -8.054 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
pit 1 -2.541 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ukt 1 -3.800 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ym,t − lt − wrt 1 -2.405 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
lt 1 -2.902 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ct − yt 0 -1.449 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
invt − yt 1 -3.160 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ut 1 -2.697 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
rt 0 -2.642 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
Note: The first column of the table contains the data variables,
the second column provides the number of lagged differences in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test as chosen by the Akaike information
criteria, the third column presents the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistic, and the last three columns provide the critical values for
the Dickey-Fuller test at the one, five and ten percent levels. If
the test statistic is greater in absolute value than the critical value,
then the researcher can conclude that there is evidence that the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the data series can be rejected at the
corresponding level of significance.
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Table 2.5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests and Analysis of Cointegrating Relationships
Var Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Diff Stat
ym,t − lt 1 -1.061 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
wrt 0 -0.115 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
ct 1 -1.571 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
invt 1 -1.550 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
yt 1 -1.735 -3.484 -2.885 -2.575
Dep Indep βj1 t-test Lag ADF 1 % 5 % 10 %
Var Var Estim H0 : β
j
1 = 1 Diff Stat
j = yh, c, i j = yh, c, i
ym,t − lt wrt 1.228 19.98 0 -3.272 -2.589 -1.950 -1.615
ct yt 1.103 16.67 0 -2.892 -2.589 -1.950 -1.615
invt yt 0.935 -3.68 1 3.834 -2.59 -1.950 -1.615
Note: The top portion of the table contains the output of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the data
variables listed in the first column. The second column provides the number of lagged differences in the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test as chosen by the Akaike information criteria, the third column presents
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic, and the last three columns provide the critical values for
the Dickey-Fuller test at the one, five and ten percent levels. If the test statistic is greater in absolute
value than the critical value, then the researcher can conclude that there is evidence that the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the data series can be rejected at the corresponding level of significance.
The second portion of the table presents analysis of the cointegrating relationships present in the data.
The first two columns list the dependent and independent variables of the potentially cointegrated
regression, the third column presents the estimate of the coefficient of the regression, and the fourth
column provides the t-test of the null-hypothesis that the cointegrated vector between the dependent
and independent variable is (1,−1). All three t-tests provide evidence that the empirical cointegrating
vector in all three regression is different from (1,−1). The last five columns of the second portion of
the table provide the output of the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the residuals resulting from the
corresponding regression.
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Macroeconomic Data (Quarterly) Used by Edge, Laubach and Williams
(2003) Before and After BEA Revisions
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Note: The solid line shows the data after the annual revisions of 2001–2004 and the benchmark revision of
2003, while the dashed line shows the pre-revision data used by Edge et al. (2003).
27
Figure 2.2: Empirical Impulse Responses to a Policy Shock
Note: The empirical impulse responses are given by the solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation
confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
Note: The empirical impulse responses are given by the solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation
confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Chapter 3
Baseline Calvo Sticky Wage Model
3.1 A DSGE New Keynesian Model
The model presented in this chapter is a fully specified New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model that includes price and wage indexation within a sticky price and
wage environment. The baseline model presented here is based on the DSGE model of Del
Negro et al. (2004) consisting of households, firms and fiscal and monetary authorities and
has been extended to allow wage setters the ability to index wages to average wage growth in
the economy as well as to price and technology growth in periods when they are not allowed
to reoptimize. The model is made up of an output market, an intermediate goods market,
a bond market, a money market, a capital market and a labor market. It also includes
the features of variable capital utilization, capital adjustment costs, habit persistence and
technology growth.
3.2 Firms
Firms in the baseline economy are divided into two groups – final goods firms and inter-
mediate goods firms. The firms in the final goods sector produce the final output good Yt
using a continuum of intermediate goods on the unit interval indexed by z. The intermediate
goods firm hires labor and capital from the households and sets its price Pt(z) in order to
maximize profit.
3.2.1 Final Goods Firms
The production function of the final goods sector looks as follows:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
1
1+λf dz
]1+λf
, (3.1)
with λf1+λf > 1 representing the time-varying price elasticity of the intermediate good. The
firm’s cost minimization problem yields the following continuum of intermediate demand
conditions:
Yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]− 1+λf
λf
Yt, (3.2)
with
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
− 1
λf dz
]−λf
(3.3)
representing the aggregate price index.
Intermediate Goods Firms
The intermediate firm sets its own price and hires labor to produce its differentiated good
Yt(z) according to the following production function.
Yt(z) = max {Z1−αt Kt(z)αLt(z)1−α − ZtΦ, 0}, (3.4)
with α representing the capital share of output, Φ representing a fixed cost parameter and Zt
representing the labor-augmenting technology level, which is specified to follow the unit root
process below:
Zt
Zt−1
= eγze
z
t (3.5)
Here, zt is the technology shock, and γz is the growth rate of technology.
The intermediate goods firms must choose the quantity of capital Kt(z), composite labor
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Lt(z) and the optimal mix of labor provided by individual households to maximize profit
given wages, rental rates and the prices of other firms. The choice of optimal mix results in
the following demand condition for labor of household j by firm z:
Lt(z, j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
(
Y˜t(z)
Kt(z)
αZ1−αt
) 1
1−α
=
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Lt(z), (3.6)
where Y˜t(z) = Z1−αt Kt(z)αLt(z)1−α represents the variable portion of the intermediate firm’s
output, and the aggregate wage Wt is given as
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1
λw dj
]λw
. (3.7)
The individual households’ labor is aggregated to produce the composite labor as follows
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
1
1+λw dj
]1+λw
=
∫ 1
0
Lt(z)dz. (3.8)
Given the optimal mix of individual laborers, the firm’s optimal use of aggregated labor
and capital results in the following first-order condition for cost minimization
Kt(z)
Lt(z)
=
α
1− α
Wt/Pt
Rt/Pt
, (3.9)
where Wt is the aggregate wage and Rkt is the rental rate of capital. Since these factor prices
are taken as given by the firm, this condition results in a capital-labor ratio that is constant
across firms. Real marginal cost, given below, is thus also constant across firms.1
MCt = α−α(1− α)−(1−α)Wt
Pt
1−αRkt
Pt
α
Z
−(1−α)
t (3.10)
In addition to hiring labor and capital, the intermediate goods firms must also set their
prices. The way they do so will vary according to the parameterization of the model. The New
Keynesian models presented in this paper follow the basic assumption of Calvo price-setting by
intermediate goods firms. Under the Calvo assumption of sticky prices, firms are not allowed
1Constant marginal cost holds when each firm chooses the same output-to-labor ratio. This happens in the
case of a constant returns to scale technology as in equation (3.4).
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to set the optimal price each period. Instead, every period each firm faces the probability
1−θp of being able to change its price. Thus on average a firm has a constrained price for 11−θp
periods. In the general version of the model, it is assumed that firms have the opportunity
to index prices to either steady state inflation or lagged inflation in the intervening periods
when they are not permitted to reoptimize prices. The addition of backwards indexation and
the subsequent form of the Phillips curve is due to Christiano et al. (2001). Thus the fraction
of firms not reoptimizing set prices as follows:
Pt(z) = Pt−1(z)pi
δp
t−1p¯i
(1−δp) (3.11)
Thus, the parameter δp ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of backwards price indexation. A
value of one represents fully backwards indexation, while a value of zero represents the Yun
(1996) case of full indexation to steady state inflation. The Calvo firms solve the following
maximization problem:
max
Pt(z)
∞∑
i=0
(θpβ)iEt
[
Ξt+i
(
Xpt,iPt(z)Yt+i(z)− Yt+i(z)MCnt+i(z)
)]
(3.12)
subject to
Yt+i(z) =
(
Xpt,iPt(z)
Pt+i
)− 1+λf
λf
Yt+i, (3.13)
with
Xpt,i =

∏i
j=1Π
δ
t+j−1Π
1−δ i ≥ 1
1 i = 0
(3.14)
Here, Πt represents gross price inflation with a steady state value of Π. The firm discounts
time t + i profits at βiΞt+i, which is the same kernel used by households to discount future
claims.2 The first-order condition that solves the firm’s problem is given by
2The Ξt term appears here due to the presence of complete markets and disappears in the linearized model.
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Ξt
(
P˜t(z)
Pt
)− 1+λf
λf
−1
1
λfPt
(P˜t(z)− (1 + λf )MCt)Yt +
Et
∞∑
i=1
(θβ)iΞt+i
(
P˜t(z)(
∏i
j=1Π
δ
t+j−1Π
1−δ)
Pt+i
)− 1+λf
λf
−1
(
∏i
j=1Π
δ
t+j−1Π
1−δ)
Pt+iλf
(P˜t(z)(
i∏
j=1
Πδt+j−1Π¯
1−δ)− (1 + λf )MCt+i)Yt+i = 0, (3.15)
where P˜t(z) represents the price chosen by the optimizing firm. With all firms behaving in
this way, the symmetric equilibrium price index is as follows:
Pt = [(1− θp)P˜t−
1
λf + θp(Pt−1Πδt−1Π
1−δ)
− 1
λf ]−λf (3.16)
3.3 Households
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived households in this economy indexed by j, who
each maximize lifetime utility over choices of current values of consumption Ct(j), real money
holdings Mt(j)/Pt, real bond holdings Bt+1(j)/Pt, capital Kt(j), the capital utilization rate
ukt (j), investment It(j), and in some periods the wage Wt(j) it will receive by maximizing
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi
[
ln(Ct+i(j)− hCt+i−1(j)) + am1− γm
Mt(j)
PtZt
(1−γm)
− an
1 + γn
N1+γnt+i (j)
]}
(3.17)
subject to
Ct(j) =
Wt(j)
Pt
Nt(j) + Πt(j)− Mt(j)−Mt−1(j)
Pt
−
(
1
Et(Rt|ΩHt )
)
Bt+1 −Bt
Pt
−Tt + R
k
t
Pt
ukt (j)K¯t−1(j)− a(ukt (j))K¯t−1(j), (3.18)
and
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K¯t(j) = (1− δ)K¯t−1(j) +
(
1− S
(
It(j)
It−1(j)
))
It(j). (3.19)
Here, γm > 0, γn > 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1.
Wt(j)
Pt
is the real wage, Πt(j) are profits
paid by the firm, Tt is the household’s real net tax payment, K¯t−1(j) is the fixed stock of
capital chosen last period, and Et(Rt | ΩHt ) is the household’s expected gross rate of nominal
interest Rt using its time t information set ΩHt . The household’s information set does not
contain the monetary policy shock, so the household’s expected value and the actual value
for the gross nominal interest rate can differ by the policy shock. This model incorporates
an internal habit persistence parameter 0 < h < 1, capital utilization costs governed by the
adjustment cost function a(·), and investment adjustment costs governed by the function S(·)
such that S′ > 0, S′′ > 0.
The first order conditions for the respective choices of Ct(j),Mt(j)/Pt, Bt+1(j)/Pt, Kt(j),
ukt (j) and It(j) are given as
Ξt = (Ct(j)− hCt−1(j))−1 − βhEt((Ct+1(j)− hCt(j))−1 (3.20)
(
Mt
PtZt
)−γm
= am
(
1
ΞtZt
)
Et(Rt | ΩHt )
Et(Rt | ΩHt )− 1
(3.21)
Ξt = βEt(Rt | ΩHt )Et(Ξt+1Π−1t+1) (3.22)
Ξkt = µtΞ
k
t
[
1− S
(
It(j)
It−1(j)
)
− S′
(
It(j)
It−1(j)
)
It(j)
It−1(j)
]
+
βEt
(
µt+1Ξkt+1
[
S′
(
It+1(j)
It(j)
)
It+1(j)2
It(j)2
])
(3.23)
Rkt
Pt
= a′(ukt ) (3.24)
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Ξkt = βEt
[
Ξt+1
(
Rkt+1
Pt
ukt+1 − a(ukt+1)
)
+ Ξkt+1(1− δ)
]
(3.25)
Here, Ξt and Ξkt represent the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and the capital
evolution equation, respectively.
Following Erceg et al. (2000), the households behave in Calvo fashion setting wages with
an arrival rate of 1 − θw. Several works in the literature (Del Negro et al. (2004), Smets
and Wouters (2002), Christiano et al. (2005) and Givens (2005)) assume that households not
permitted to reoptimize, can update their wages to lagged values of inflation or steady state
inflation just as firms do in the goods market. Since there is technology growth in the model
presented here, it is also assumed that wage-setters can index to productivity growth.
The approach taken in this paper is to allow households not only the ability to index to
lagged price inflation and lagged technology growth but also to lagged wage inflation. The
motivation for allowing the wage to be indexed to average wage growth follows along the same
lines as the “catching up with the Joneses” argument for the inclusion of an external habit
in the utility function used by Abel (1990). Individuals are assumed to take into account
what others made across the economy last period when updating wages. Also, as pointed
out by Taylor (1999) and Blinder and Choi (1990), there is some empirical microevidence of
indexation to past wages by wage setters in the US economy.
The households set wages to solve the following problem:3
max
Wt(j)
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
(θwβ)i
[
...− an
1 + γn
N1+γnt+i (j)
]}
(3.26)
subject to (3.18) and the demand condition
Nt(j) =
[
Wt(j)Xwt,i
Wt+i
]− 1+λw
λw
Lt+i (3.27)
with
3The ... in (3.26) represents the portion of the utility function that does not appear in the first order
condition for the wage.
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Xwt,i =

∏i
j=1(Πt+j−1e
γz+z1+j−1)η1(Πw,t+j−1)η2(Πeγz)1−η1−η2 i ≥ 1
1 i = 0
(3.28)
Equation (3.27) results from the aggregation of labor demand for household j given by equa-
tion (3.6) across firms. Equation (3.28) represents the indexation by wage setters in periods
when they cannot set wages. Here, Πw,t is the gross rate of wage inflation. In this economic
environment, real wages should grow on average because of technology growth. Thus, when
setting wages households should try to increase nominal wages based on price growth and
technology growth. Here, 0 < η1 < 1 represents the degree of indexation to lagged inflation
and technology growth, and 0 < η2 < 1 represents the degree of indexation to lagged wage
inflation, with 1 − η1 − η2 > 0 representing the amount of indexation to steady state price
and technology growth.
The first-order condition for the household’s problem is given by
ΞtLt
λwWt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(θwβ)iΞt+iNt+i(j)
[
−X
w
t,iW˜t
Pt+i
+
(1 + λw)anNt+i(j)γn
Ξt+i
]
= 0 (3.29)
The presence of complete markets is assumed here, thus the risk-sharing behavior of house-
holds results in each household facing the same constraints and choosing the same consump-
tion bundle, despite having different wages. Therefore, each household chooses consumption
independent of its respective wage, and each chooses the wage, taking its consumption bundle
as given.
3.3.1 Policy
I follow Christiano et al. (2005) by assuming that the interest rate follows the same
process in the model and the empirical VAR. Thus the monetary authority sets the interest
rate according to the following feedback rule,
Rt = Γ(ΩHt )e
Rt , (3.30)
where Γ(·) represents the exponential function of the interest rate equation resulting from the
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empirical VAR, and ΩHt represents the information set of the household which is assumed to
be orthogonal to the policy shock Rt . The policy rule is presented here in its nonlinear form
to match up with the rest of the nonlinear model.
The model also contains a fiscal authority whose budget constraint looks as follows
Gt +
Bt
Pt
+
Mt−1
Pt
= Tt +
Mt
Pt
+
1
Et(Rt | ΩHt )
Bt+1
Pt
, (3.31)
where Gt is government expenditure. In this model, Gt is assumed to always be zero. Govern-
ment expenditures could also be modeled explicitly as following an exogenous shock process
with mean zero. Since the focus of this work is on the response of the model to monetary
policy and technology shocks, the fiscal policy shock is set to its mean value of zero and
fluctuations in government expenditures are ignored.
3.3.2 Resource Constraints
Integrating the household’s budget constraint (3.18) across households and combining it
with the government’s budget constraint (3.31) and the fact that the final goods and labor
market are both perfectly competitive (and thus offer zero profit) results in the following
resource constraint:
Ct + It + a(ukt )K¯t−1 = Yt (3.32)
Yt in the above equation is defined as in equation (3.1), while aggregate output defined in
terms of the aggregate factors of production denoted Y˙t is governed by
Y˙t =
∫ 1
0
Yt(z)dz = Z1−αt K
α
t L
1−α
t − ZtΦ (3.33)
In the steady state, Y = Y˙ , so aggregate output in the model is approximated by (3.33)
and for mathematical simplicity Yt is assumed equal to Y˙t.
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3.3.3 Detrending the Nonstationary Model
Since technology growth follows a unit root process as dictated by equation (3.5), the
variables in the model have to be detrended as in Altig et al. (2002, 2005) and Del Negro et
al. (2004) as follows
yt = YtZt , kt =
Kt
Zt
, k¯t = K¯tZt , ct =
Ct
Zt
, it = ItZt ,mt =
Mt
PtZt
rkt =
Rkt
Pt
, wt = WtPtZt , w˜t =
W˜t
Wt
, P˜t = P˜tPt
ξt = ΞtZt, ξkt = Ξ
k
tZt, zt = ln
(
Zt
Zt−1
)
(3.34)
Thus the model can be transformed in to a detrended form that has a steady state. The
detrended model can now be linearized around this steady state. The equations of the log-
linearized model are presented below.
3.4 Log Linearized Model
This section presents the log-linearized version of the nonlinear model presented above.
In this section, xˆt = ln(x˜t) − ln(x˜), where x˜ represents the steady state value of x˜t. The
values of pˆit, pˆiw,t, rˆt and lˆt are all log deviations of the original stationary series (pit, piwt , Rt
and Lt, respectively) from their respective steady state values.4 The model presented here
only contains policy and technology shocks, with all other shocks suppressed. If the interest
here is in matching empirical and model responses to the empirically identified policy and
technology shocks, these two shocks are all that is necessary. Alternatively, if the model
were to be estimated using a likelihood approach, such as maximum likelihood or Bayesian
techniques, there would need to be at least as many shocks as endogenous variables.5 The
log-linearized version of the detrended model can be expressed as:
4Here pit represents the net inflation rate, and pi
w
t represents the net wage growth rate.
5This approach would require specifying several shocks in the model that unlike the policy and technology
shocks presented here do not have direct empirical counterparts.
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Marginal Cost
mˆct = (1− α)wˆrt + αrˆkt (3.35)
Phillips Curve
pˆit =
(1− θpβ)(1− θp)
θp(1 + δpβ)
mˆct +
δp
1 + δpβ
pˆit−1 +
β
1 + δpβ
Etpˆit+1 (3.36)
Capital-Labor Ratio
kˆt = wˆrt − rˆkt + Lˆt (3.37)
Euler Equation
(eγz − h)(eγz − βh)ξˆt = −heγzzt + heγz cˆt−1 − (e2γz + βh2)cˆt +
βheγzzt+1 + βhe
γz cˆt+1 (3.38)
Real Money Holdings
νmmˆt = −ξˆt − 1
R− 1Et(Rˆt | Ω
h
t ) (3.39)
Real Bond Holdings
ξˆt = Et(Rˆt | ΩHt ) + Et(ξˆt+1 − zt+1 − pˆit+1) (3.40)
Capital Utilization
kˆt = uˆkt − zt + ˆ¯kt−1 (3.41)
Capital Accumulation
ˆ¯kt = (1− i
k
)(ˆ¯kt−1 − zt ) +
i
k
iˆt (3.42)
Capital Stock
− ξˆt
S′′(eγz)2
+
ξˆkt
S′′(eγz)2
= −iˆt−1 + zt − βEt(ˆit+1 + zt+1) + (1 + β)ˆit (3.43)
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Investment
ξˆkt = −zt+1 +
1
rk + (1− δ)Et(r
kξˆt+1 + rkrˆkt+1 + (1− δ)ξˆkt+1) (3.44)
Capital Utilization Rate
rkrˆkt = a
′′uˆkt (3.45)
Real Wage
wˆrt = γnLˆt − ξˆt − θw(1 + η2β)κwpˆiw,t + η1θwκw(pˆit−1 − zt−1)
−(η1θw)κw(pˆit + zt ) + η2θwκwpˆiw,t−1 + θwβκwEtpˆiw,t+1, (3.46)
where
κw =
(1 + γn(1+λw)λw )
(1− θwβ)(1− θw)
Resource Constraint
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt +
i
y
iˆt (3.47)
Aggregate Output
yˆt =
α(y +Φ)
y
kˆt + (1− α)(y +Φ)
y
Lˆt (3.48)
Monetary Policy Rule
Rˆt = Φ(L)[∆(yˆt − Lˆt), pˆit, uˆkt , wˆrt , Lˆt, cˆt, iˆt, Rˆt]′, (3.49)
where Φ(L) represents the lagged polynomial of parameters estimated in the interest rate
equation of the empirical VAR from Chapter 2.
Wage Growth
pˆiw,t = pˆit + wˆrt − wˆrt−1 + zt (3.50)
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Marginal Rate of Substitution
mˆrst = γnLˆt − ξˆt (3.51)
Shock Processes
Rt ∼ iid(0, 1) (3.52)
zt ∼ iid(0, 1) (3.53)
3.4.1 Shock Specification
Since a subset of the model’s parameters are set to minimize the distance between the
model-generated IRFs and their empirical counterparts, it must be the case that shocks are
exactly comparable across the model and the data. In other words, when fitting impulse
responses between the model and the data, one must ensure that the model’s structural
shock has the same identical interpretation as the empirical structural shock. Otherwise, the
model’s impulse responses are no longer directly comparable to the data’s responses and thus
cannot be used for impulse response fitting estimation.
In order to ensure comparability between the empirical and model policy shocks, the
monetary authority in the model is assumed to set the interest rate according to (3.30) above
following the exact form of the interest rate equation of the empirical VAR. The policy shock
Rt in this equation is orthogonal to the information set of the household. Since, as discussed
earlier, the household makes decisions using its expected value of the interest rate before the
policy shock is realized, the policy shock affects only the interest rate contemporaneously,
affecting the other model variables with a lag. Thus the orthogonal assumption used to
identify the empirical shock in the data also holds in the model, and a unit increase in the
model’s policy shock corresponds to a one percent surprise increase in the interest rate just
as a policy shock does in the empirical analysis of Chapter 2.
The technology shock is identified by assuming that it is the only shock that can perma-
nently affect the level of labor productivity in the model and the data. In the data this is
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accomplished by using long-run restrictions in estimating the structural VAR as described in
Chapter 2. In the model, the technology shock zt permanently increases the level of technol-
ogy Zt according to (3.5). To see the long-run effect on productivity, notice that the growth
rate in labor productivity can be written as
ln
(
Yt
Lt
)
− ln
(
Yt−1
Lt−1
)
= ln
(
Yt
ZtLt
)
− ln
(
Yt−1
Zt−1Lt−1
)
+ ln
(
Zt
Zt−1
)
= ln
(
yt
Lt
)
− ln
(
yt−1
Lt−1
)
+ γz + zt
= (yˆt − Lˆt)− (yˆt−1 − Lˆt−1) + γz + zt (3.54)
(3.55)
Demeaned productivity can be expressed as
ln
(
Yt
Lt
)
− ln
(
Yt−1
Lt−1
)
− γz = (1− L)(yˆt − Lˆt) + zt , (3.56)
where L is the lag operator.
The long-run, cumulative effect on demeaned productivity growth of zt , found by setting
L = 1, is just zt itself. An initial value of unity for 
z
t means a one percent increase in the
cumulative sum of the growth rate of labor productivity and thus a one percent increase in
the long-run level of labor productivity as explained in Chapter 2. This means a unit increase
in zt is directly comparable to the identified empirical technology shock in Chapter 2 which
results in a permanent one percent increase in labor productivity.
3.5 Econometric Methodology
Following the work of Christiano et al. (2001, 2005), Altig et al. (2002, 2005) and Edge
et al. (2003), I calibrate a subset of the parameters of the model and choose the remaining
parameters to fit the model-driven impulse response functions as closely as possible to their
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empirical counterparts. As explained in Laubach (2003), this exercise amounts to minimizing
the following metric:
Ji = min
Θi
[Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θi)]′DT [Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θi)] (3.57)
Here, Ψˆ(ΥT ) represents the empirical estimates of the true impulse responses Ψ using
the sample ΥT ≡ {Y1, Y2, . . . , YT }, and ΨM (Θi) represents the model’s impulse responses as
functions of a subset of the model parameters Θi to be estimated.6 The minimum distance
estimator Θˆi(ΥT ) contains the parameter values that minimize the weighted square difference
between the IRFs of the model (indexed by i) and the empirical IRFs as specified in (3.57).7
The index i will take on the values fw, sw, sc, si, nb, and rtm, corresponding to the flexible
wage specification, the sticky wage specification, the staggered contracting specification, the
sticky information specification, the Nash bargaining specification and the right-to-manage
specification, respectively. Assume that the true parameter vector is given by Θ0, then the
asymptotic variance of the parameter estimates Q is defined as
Q ≡ lim
T→∞
T · E[(Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θ0))(Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θ0))′]. (3.58)
An estimate Qˆ of the asymptotic variance matrix is obtained from the bootstrapping
procedure used in Chapter 2 to generate the confidence intervals of the empirical impulse
response functions and is calculated as the sample covariance matrix of Ψˆ(ΥT ).8 The matrix
DT in (3.57) is the time-T member of the sequence of positive definite weighting matrices
{Dt}Tt=1 that is assumed to converge to the positive definite matrix D. Here, D is a diagonal
weighting matrix with the inverses of the sample variances of the corresponding Ψˆ(ΥT ) down
6Like Christiano et al. (2005), I divide the parameters into three groups. The first group Θi, as described
here, is optimally chosen to minimize (3.57), the second group includes the parameters to be calibrated, and
the final group Φ(L) represents the coefficients on the policy rule in equation (3.30) resulting from the VAR
estimated in Chapter 2.
7Here, the vector of parameter estimates Θˆi(ΥT ) is written explicitly as a function of the sample ΥT to
facilitate the presentation of the asymptotic results reported below.
8Here, the estimate of Qˆ is model-independent and thus not indexed by i.
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the main diagonal.9 This choice of weighting matrix is identical to that of Christiano et al.
(2001, 2005) and similar to that of Edge et al. (2003), who use a diagonal matrix unrelated to
the covariance matrix. The optimal weighting matrix for (3.57), however, is the inverse of the
entire covariance matrix of the empirical impulse responses. The diagonal weighting matrix
is an easier object to implement and include in the numerical optimization routine necessary
for minimum distance estimation and also makes the minimization problem easier to solve in
the sense that (3.57) reduces to a simple sum of squares in the case of a diagonal weighting
matrix. The assumption underlying the use of this more simple weighting matrix is that the
diagonal weighting matrix is a decent approximation for the inverse of the covariance matrix.
As discussed below, however, there is a cost to ignoring the off-diagonal terms of the optimal
weighting matrix because they contain some potentially important information.10
At the true parameter vector Θ0 it is assumed that
E[Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θ0)] = 0, (3.59)
In order to calculate standard errors for the parameter estimates I follow the approach outlined
by Laubach (2003)and explained here. As explained in Newey and McFadden (1994), under
certain regularity conditions
√
T (Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θ0)) L−→ N(0, Q) (3.60)
and
√
T (Θˆi(ΥT )−Θ0) L−→ N(0, V ). (3.61)
9The impulse responses whose variances are zero are excluded from the calculation of Ji. For instance,
since the orthogonal assumption is used to generate IRFs for the model and the data, the initial response to
a policy shock of each variables ordered before Rt is uniformly zero by construction and is thus excluded.
10The covariance matrix also may be close to singular and in this case its inverse unreliable. As discussed
in Chapter 7, Hall et al. (2007) have introduced an information criteria in selecting which impulse responses
to match that can solve this potential problem. In this case, the optimal weighting matrix is used to minimize
the distance between a subset of the most econometrically informative empirical impulse responses and the
model impulse responses.
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Here V represents the asymptotic variance of the estimated parameter vector defined as
V ≡ [F ′DF ]−1F ′D′QDF [F ′DF ]−1. (3.62)
F represents the probability limit of the Jacobian matrix containing the derivatives of (Ψˆ(ΥT )−
ΨM (Θ0)) with respect to the elements of Θ0 as follows:
F ≡ plim
{
∂(Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θ0))
∂Θ0
}
(3.63)
The asymptotic values of V and F are model independent, in the sense that they both
depend on the hypothetical true parameter vector Θ0 and are not indexed by i. When
estimating the parameters, however, the estimates of F and thus V will be model dependent
as follows:
Fˆi =
∂(Ψˆ(ΥT )−ΨM (Θˆi))
∂Θˆi
(3.64)
Vˆi = [Fˆ ′iDT Fˆi]
−1Fˆ ′iD
′
T QˆDT Fˆi[Fˆ
′
iDT Fˆi]
−1. (3.65)
Equation (3.65) indicates that the estimated variance of the parameter vector Θˆi depends
on the estimated covariance matrix of the empirical impulse response functions Qˆ and the
estimated weighting matrix DT as well as Fˆi. I also calculated the standard errors assuming
that the diagonal weighting matrix with the inverses of the variances of the empirical impulse
responses placed along the diagonal was a reasonable approximation of the inverse of the error
covariance matrix by replacing Qˆ with the diagonal weighting matrix when calculating (3.65).
In this case I found standard errors that were implausibly small. This indicates that the off-
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix potentially contain some important information
that is being lost when only the diagonal elements are used to fit the model to the data.
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3.6 Flexible Wage Model
For each of the models analyzed in the next four chapters, I calibrate steady state gross
inflation Π as 1.01. This implies an average annual growth in prices of four percent. The
fixed cost parameter Φ is set so that the steady state value of profits for the intermediate
goods firms are zero, and an is set so that the steady state value of labor is equal to one.
Once these values are set, the ratios C/Y, I/Y and I/K as well as the values R and rk are
determined by the steady state of the model.
The parameter vector Θcfw to be calibrated in the flexible wage model also includes α, β,
δ, γn, λf , λw, S, a′′, γz, θw, η1 and η2. I set α to 0.36, implying a steady state capital share
of 36 percent, a value used by many in the literature including Christiano et al. (2005) and
Altig et al. (2002, 2005). I set β equal to 0.99, a value implying a steady state annualized
real rate of interest of four percent and used by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). I set
δ = 0.025, implying an annual depreciation rate of ten percent, the same value used by Edge
et al. (2003), Christiano et al. (2005), Altig et al. (2002, 2005) and Del Negro et al. (2004).
The parameter γn is set equal to one, as in Christiano et al. (2005) and Altig et al. (2002,
2005), implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to unity. The value of λf is set at 0.3
following Del Negro et al. The growth of the economy γz is set at 0.006, implying an annual
growth rate of 2.4 percent.11
The parameter a′′ representing the second derivative of the capital adjustment cost func-
tion is set equal to 0.01 as in Christiano et al. (2005) and Altig et al. (2002, 2005). For the
flexible wage model, the wage stickiness parameter θw is set to zero. With wage stickiness
turned off, the parameter values η1, η2 and λw do not appear in the reduced form of the flex-
ible wage model. The remaining parameters θp, δp and h are estimated using the minimum
distance estimation approach of Christiano et al. (2001, 2005).
In order to estimate the parameters of the model, I fit the responses of output, consump-
tion, investment, hours, inflation, the interest rate, capital utilization, labor productivity and
the real wage simultaneously to the empirical responses arising from the policy and technology
11This value is calculated as the mean of the empirical productivity growth series, since according to the
model ∆(lnYt − lnLt) = γz +∆(ln yt − lnht) + Zt .
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shocks. The reasons for choosing these responses include comparability to the work of others
like Edge et al. (2003) and Altig et al. (2002, 2005) and also because these are the series used
in the VAR of Chapter 2 that contain unique information.12 I also present estimates of the
parameters using the same set of responses to each shock individually.13
The estimates using the above responses and both shocks are reported in Table 3.1, with
standard errors reported in parentheses. These parameters are given by θp = 0.948, δp = 0.978
and h = 0.765. Thus, in order to match the empirical impulse responses, there must be a
significant amount of price stickiness present, with the estimated value of θp implying an
average duration of contracts of over four and half years. This value is not as high as that
found by Christiano et al. (2005) who report that with flexible wages, the amount of price
stickiness goes to unity. The flexible wage model also needs a large amount of habit persistence
to best match the empirical responses. The degree of backwards price indexation δp is driven
close to its upper bound of unity, a result discussed further below. Table 3.1 also reports the
minimized values for the J-statistic of equation (3.57), with the second-to-last row indicating
the J-value when unemployment is ignored, and the last row indicating the J-value when the
response of unemployment is taken into account.
The parameter estimates resulting from matching the model to the empirical responses
using only one shock at a time are also displayed in Table 3.1. The parameter estimates
resulting from matching just the policy shock by itself are close to the estimates obtained
when fitting responses from both shocks, with θp = 0.948, h = 0.763, and δp driven to unity.
The estimates from fitting just the responses of the technology shock, are also similar to the
estimates using both shocks. Fitting just the technology responses results in slightly less price
stickiness (θp = 0.941) and price indexation (δp = 0.859) and slightly more habit persistence
(h = 0.807). The standard error of the price indexation parameter (2.831) indicates that this
parameter is poorly identified. For instance, the J-value of 212.29 reported in the second-
to-last row of the third column of Table 3.1 rises to 212.53 if δp is set at unity and rises to
12This is opposed to a series like wage inflation, which is a function of inflation and the real wage.
13Hall et al. (2007) investigate an information criteria that can potentially offer econometric evidence about
which responses to include in the estimation routine.
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212.64 if δp is set at zero. This poor identification of δp also holds for the cases of fitting both
shocks and fitting the policy shock by itself.14
Figure 3.1 presents the IRFs resulting from the parameter estimation that simultaneously
fits the policy and technology shock responses of the model to the data.15 Figure 3.1(a)
reveals the flexible wage specification’s inability to match the policy responses of the real
wage and wage inflation series with the empirical evidence.16 The model’s initial responses
to a policy shock of both of these series are much larger than the responses found in the data
but not as long lived. This results because without any rigidities in the labor market, the
real wage is forced to equal the marginal rate of substitution, which is negatively related to
marginal utility and thus the interest rate. As the interest rate increases, future consumption
becomes more attractive and current consumption falls, causing marginal utility to rise and
the marginal rate of substitution to fall. This causes the real wage and wage inflation to fall
as well. This indicates that some degree of model wage inflexibility is necessary to match the
empirical response functions involving wage behavior.
Figure 3.1(b) contains the impulse responses of the flexible wage version of the model to
the technology shock. Here the most notable aspects are the poor behaviors of the inflation,
hours, productivity and real wage responses. The model inflation response hovers around zero,
while the empirical inflation response starts off with a very negative value and slowly returns
to zero. The inflation response to the technology shock under the estimated parameterization
is unable to match up with the empirical series because of the relationship between inflation
and marginal cost. Inflation in this model is a function of current, past and expected real
marginal cost as explained in Gali and Gertler (1999). Inflation can become negative on
impact, in this case, only if current or future marginal costs are negative. In the model
14With extreme values of price stickiness, like those reported in the first three columns of Table 3.1, changes
in the price indexation parameter should not have much effect on the fit of the model. For instance under
complete price stickiness or complete price flexibility, the parameter δp no longer affects the responses of model
shocks and is thus completely unidentified.
15Here the focus is on the behavior of output, inflation and the labor market variables of hours, wage
inflation, the real wage and labor productivity, so only these responses are displayed.
16A good fit in this case results if the model responses stays within the confidence band of the empirical
response for the duration of the impulse response experiment.
49
presented here, inflation is actually a function of detrended marginal cost, so although the
level of the real wage does not fall after a shock to productivity, the real wage detrended by
the technology shock does fall under the estimated parameterization. Thus inflation is able to
become slightly negative despite an increase in the level of the real wage and the real rental
rate.
Another shortcoming of the flexible wage model involves the response of hours to the
technology shock. The model hours response in Figure 3.1(b) starts off negative, staying so
for about a year and a half, in contrast to the empirical response which stays significantly
positive for almost three years. The initial response of the real wage shows some problems as
well matching up with the data, displaying a much larger initial response than its empirical
counterpart. With no rigidity in the labor market, productivity jumps up by much more in
the model than in the data on impact of the technology shock. This causes a counterfactually
large jump in the real wage. Thus under both the technology and policy shocks, the response
of the real wage is too extreme.17 The wage inflation response, on the other hand, matches
quite closely with the empirical response in this case since the response is driven primarily
by the technology shock in both the data and the model.
3.7 Baseline Model with Wage Rigidities
As the results from the flexible wage model indicate, some degree of wage rigidity is
necessary to match the stylized facts found in the US data. With the sticky wage model,
the Calvo wage-setting mechanism comes into play as the parameters governing the setting
of wages are no longer constrained to equal zero. Thus, the parameter vector Θcsw to be
17There are two explanations for the poor fit of the individual series shown in panel (a) and panel (b) and
discussed here. The first explanation involves the trade-off that arises when fitting the individual series of
the model to those in the data. In other words, it is not possible that all of the series can simultaneously
fit well, and in several cases to fit one series better means to fit another series worse. An example of this
is discussed below for the case of the sticky wage specification’s hours response to a technology shock. The
other explanation is that the flexible wage model is simply incapable of replicating the individual series, even
if the parameters were allowed to vary in order to fit only the individual series in question. This is the case,
for instance, with the real wage and wage inflation responses to a policy shock, which cannot fit the empirical
responses under any parameterizations of the model.
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calculated in the minimization of (3.57) now includes the parameters θw, η1 and η2.18 In
addition, the parameter λw is set at 0.3 as in Del Negro et al. (2004). The estimates for the
sticky wage model resulting from the estimation strategy using responses from both shocks
are shown in Table 3.1. In this case, the sticky wage mechanism is important for the fit of the
model, since the sticky wage parameter θw is estimated as 0.768 and is significantly different
from zero, and the fit of the model compared to the flexible wage specification is improved.
This value implies that wage contracts in the model are fixed for an average of 4.3 quarters.
This value of the sticky wage parameter, however, is higher than the value of 0.64 reported
by Christiano et al. (2005) as well as that of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) (0.567), but
in line with the values reported by Altig et al. (2002) (0.78) and Altig et al. (2005) (0.72).
The degree of price stickiness estimated when fitting responses from both shocks is given
by 0.899. This value is slightly lower than the value estimated under flexible wages, indicating
modest support for the claim of Christiano et al. (2005) that with sticky wages, less price
stickiness is necessary to match model and data impulse responses.19 The degree of price
indexation (δp = 0.847) is also lower in this case than under the flexible wage case. The habit
persistence parameter, estimated as 0.845, is higher than in the flexible wage case and also
higher than the values reported by Christiano et al. (2005) (0.65), Altig et al. (2002) (0.65),
Altig et al. (2005) (0.73), and Edge et al. (2003) (0.64).
When matching both shocks, the parameter η1 measuring the degree of indexation to past
wages in the wage-setting process is estimated at 0.127, implying a value of 0.873 for η2,
the parameter measuring the degree of indexation to past wage growth. This reveals that
indexation to past wage growth is more important than indexation to past inflation when
setting wages. Table 3.1 also provides estimates for the parameters of the sticky wage model
resulting from fitting just the responses to a policy shock and a technology shock, respectively.
When matching just the policy shock, more price stickiness (θp = 0.905), a higher degree of
price indexation (δp = 0.902), a lower degree of habit persistence (h = 0.810), less wage
18Here I assume that agents only index to past values and constrain η1 + η2 = 1 to analyze the relative
importance of indexation to past price and wage growth.
19Christiano et al. (2005) report this result when matching only responses from policy shocks. The results
of Christiano et al. correspond directly with the results reported in the third and sixth columns of Table 3.1.
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stickiness (θw = 0.631) and more indexation of wages to past prices (η1 = 1.000) is necessary.
The amount of wage stickiness is directly comparable with the value of 0.64 estimated by
Christiano et al. (2005) who use only policy shocks to generate their parameter estimate.
The technology shock results show that in the presence of a technology shock and sticky
wages, less price stickiness (θp = 0.739) and price indexation (δp = 0.000), and more wage
stickiness (θw = 0.915) and habit persistence (h = 0.885) are needed to match the empirical
responses as compared to the results when both shocks are used to estimate parameters.
The lower amounts of price stickiness and indexation of prices to lagged inflation match the
empirical results of Chapter 2 that the inflation response to a technology shock displays less
intrinsic inertia than the inflation response to a policy shock. Indexation to past inflation
(η1 = 0.188) is also less important than under a policy shock. This seems to suggest that
indexation to past wage growth is important in fitting the responses to a technology shock but
not in fitting the responses to a policy shock. The reason being that wage growth contains
information about price and technology growth. Following a technology shock, wage growth
contains information on technology and inflation, while in the absence of a technology shock,
wage growth only contains information on price growth. Thus, following a technology shock,
individuals gain information by indexing to past wage growth, while following a policy shock,
no such gain exists.
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse response functions for the sticky wage model in response to
both policy and technology shocks and reveals the gains in fit when sticky wages are included
in the model. In Figure 3.2(a), where the policy responses are displayed, the real wage and
wage inflation no longer exhibit the severe initial reaction that they did under the flexible
wage version of the model. This happens because wages are no longer strictly a function of
the marginal rate of substitution, but now also depend on current, lagged and future wage
and price inflation as well as the current and lagged technology shock. Thus wage movements
exhibit much more inertia in the sticky wage case. This translates into more inertia for real
marginal costs and thus for price inflation. There are some slight problems, however, with
the persistence of the inflation, wage growth and real wage series, since they cannot capture
the degree of persistence found in the data, with each failing to stay negative as long as their
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empirical counterparts.
Figure 3.2(b) displays the responses from the sticky wage specification following a tech-
nology shock. The sticky wage specification fails to match the response of inflation and hours
but offers a noticeable improvement over the flexible wage version of the model in matching
the other responses. The same fundamental problem in matching the inflation response to
a technology shock arises in the case of sticky wages as it did in the case of flexible wages.
Namely, in order for inflation to drop, current and expected future marginal costs need to fall
relative to trend in a way that can match the substantial and immediate drop in the empirical
response of inflation to a technology shock. The sticky wage version of the model, like the
flexible wage version of the model, is unable to generate this immediate drop in inflation.
The sticky wage friction, however, does help constrain the impact responses of productivity
and the real wage, so that these impact responses do not display the counterfactually large
responses they did under flexible wages. In fact, the real wage response is now too restrained,
since initially it does not rise by as much as the empirical real wage response. This initially
subdued response also keeps the wage inflation series from matching the large initial response
of the empirical wage inflation response. The productivity and real wage responses also have
problems matching the smooth upward climb of their empirical counterparts. The hours re-
sponse shows improvement relative to the flexible wage case, but the impact response is too
negative and the ensuing path too dampened to match the empirical response. This stems
from the large amount of habit persistence and investment adjustment costs, both features
which help the overall fit of the model but hurt the fit of hours. With large amounts of habit
persistence and investment adjustment costs, a technology shock that boosts productivity
causes hours to initially fall. In other words, the income effect can dominate the substitu-
tion effect following a rise in productivity. This is because habit persistence constrains the
response of consumption, and investment adjustment costs constrains the response of invest-
ment and thus savings by the household. When a household sees its productivity rise, it
cannot freely adjust consumption and investment and so optimally takes advantage of the
technology shock using the only other avenue it has by increasing leisure and thus decreasing
its supply of hours.
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In both the flexible wage and sticky wage specifications, the model is unable to generate
series for the responses of unemployment to policy and technology shocks. This is because
both versions of the model ignore adjustments of labor at the extensive margin, which mea-
sures the change in workers, and focus only on adjustments at the intensive margin, which
measures the change in hours. This means that neither model can explain unemployment,
equilibrium or otherwise. In both models, aggregate labor supplied equals aggregate labor
demanded. Under the flexible wage specification, there is no rigidity at all, and so there is no
under-utilization or over-utilization of labor in this case. With sticky wages, the supply of per
capita hours can differ from the marginal rate of substitution at the resulting real wage. The
excess of the supply of hours that would equate the marginal rate of substitution with the real
wage over the actual supply of hours can provide some measure of aggregate under-utilization
of hours but not unemployment, in the sense that at the given wage, households would like
to supply a possibly different per capita amount of hours.
3.7.1 Flexible Versus Sticky Wages
The results presented here indicate that the sticky wage specification improves on the
flexible wage specification by introducing a labor market rigidity, which allows for the sluggish
adjustment of labor market variables like the real wage and wage inflation. The question
remains, however, whether or not the Calvo-style wage rigidity introduced by the sticky wage
framework is the best rigidity to include in a dynamic model of the US economy. The sticky
wage specification suffers from some obvious problems. First, it is incapable of explaining the
responses of unemployment to policy and technology shocks. Second, it is unable to match up
with certain stylized facts in the data, most notably, for instance, the response of inflation to a
technology shock. Also, as Taylor (1999) points out contracts are often more of a negotiation
than the Calvo wage-setting specification would indicate, and survey evidence presented by
and Blinder and Choi (1990) supports this more two-sided approach to the labor market.
This evidence and reality stands in contrast to the Calvo framework in which households
are considered monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor. Recent work by Mankiw and
Reis (2006a) and Trigari (2004), among others, has sought to analyze other labor market
54
rigidities in place of the Calvo framework. There are also other labor market frameworks that
predate the introduction of Calvo wage-setting into the labor market by Erceg et al. (2000),
such as the staggered real contracting framework of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b). The
following chapters introduce some alternative labor market rigidities into the DSGE model
presented here and systematically investigate the effect that these alternative rigidities have
on the performance and fit of the model.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Estimates – Flexible and Sticky Wage Models
Flexible Wage Model Sticky Wage Model
Shock Shock
Param Pol, Tech Pol Tech Pol, Tech Pol Tech
θp 0.948 0.948 0.941 0.899 0.905 0.739
(0.011) (0.008) (0.363) (0.162) (0.084) (0.334)
δp 0.978 1.000 0.859 0.847 0.902 0.000
(–) (–) (2.828) (0.290) (0.235) (–)
h 0.765 0.763 0.807 0.845 0.810 0.885
(0.069) (0.068) (0.052) (0.184) (0.113) (0.145)
θw – – – 0.768 0.631 0.827
(–) (–) (–) (0.197) (0.188) (0.226)
η1 – – – 0.127 1.000 0.188
(–) (–) (–) (0.403) (–) (0.515)
η2 – – – 0.873 0.000 0.812
(–) (–) (–) (–) (–) (–)
J 534.11 320.08 212.29 293.74 142.67 130.88
J with ut 679.85 431.95 246.17 439.48 254.53 164.76
Note: Columns two through four provide parameter estimates and standard errors (in
parentheses) for the flexible wage model, while columns five through seven provide
parameter estimates and standard errors for the sticky wage model. The columns
specify which shocks are used to fit the model to the data when generating parameter
estimates. The second-to-last row provides the measure of goodness-of-fit expressed
in equation (3.57) of the estimated model when unemployment responses are not
used in fitting the model to the data, while the last row provides the goodness-of-fit
measure when unemployment responses are used to fit the model to the data. Entries
of – denote values that were not estimated. A parameter estimate with a standard
error value reported as – indicates that the parameter estimate was driven to a lower
or upper bound.
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Figure 3.1: Flexible Wage Model Impulse Responses with Fixed Cost Parameter Cali-
brated
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 3.2: Sticky Wage Model Impulse Responses
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Chapter 4
Mankiw-Reis Sticky Information Model
The sticky information framework of Mankiw and Reis (2001a) assumes that information
disseminates slowly through the economy. This framework was first used in the context of the
firm’s pricing problem to explain macroeconomic movements in response to monetary shocks.
In contrast to the firms in the sticky price Calvo model, firms facing sticky information are
allowed to fully reoptimize prices each period. Firms, however, receive updated information
in a staggered random fashion and can go several periods without any new information.
Thus, there are agents in the sticky information economy making decisions based on various
degrees of understanding of the current economic environment that they are operating in.
This assumption of information diffusion is similar to the Calvo model’s price adjustment
assumption, since each firm faces the same probability each period of updating its information
set and thus its pricing plan.
Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2002) use a simple dynamic model to show that a framework
in which price-setting firms face sticky information outperforms the standard Calvo model
along three dimensions. First, the sticky information model always leads to contractionary
disinflations, while the basic Calvo model in which firms face a random staggered chance
to change prices implies a counterfactual expansionary disinflation as explained in Chapter
1.1 Second, the sticky information model more closely replicates the hump-shaped responses
of output and inflation in response to a monetary policy shock such as the one analyzed
in Chapter 2 of the current work. Third, the sticky information model better captures the
positive correlation between the level of output and the change in inflation.2
Khan and Zhu (2002) use a VAR approach to create dynamic forecasts of macroeconomic
variables and estimate the frequency of information updating within a sticky information
model, finding that on average firms in the US update information every four quarters.
Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) show that the sticky information Phillips curve is capa-
ble of explaining disagreements involving inflation expectations in the US over the postwar
period. Mankiw and Reis (2001b) extend the sticky information assumption to the labor
market, modeling nominal wages w∗t as a linear function of prices pt, productivity θzt and
employment et as follows
w∗t = pt + θ
z
t + αeet, (4.1)
Mankiw and Reis argue that the form of equation (4.1) can be supported either with
a union or efficiency wage argument. Union aggressiveness and thus real wages should in-
crease with employment and productivity. Under the efficiency wage argument, wages should
increase with the incentive to shirk and increase with the quality of outside alternatives avail-
able to the worker. When employment is high, the threat of unemployment is less and thus
the incentive to shirk is higher. When productivity is high so too is the quality of outside
alternatives available to the worker.
Under sticky information, workers cannot always set wages using updated information. A
1When Mankiw and Reis (2001a, 2002) refer to the Calvo model, they have in mind a model in which
firms face a staggered, random opportunity to change prices each period, a model that leads to a strictly
forward-looking Phillips curve and thus expansionary disinflations. More complex Calvo models such as the
one used in this work and Christiano et al. (2001, 2005), for example, have firms fully re-optimizing prices in
a random staggered fashion but mechanically updating prices to lagged inflation or other aggregate measures
in the periods when they are not permitted to re-optimize. This type of model, like the sticky information
model, implies contractionary disinflations. Chapter 5 of the current work further discusses how disinflations
proceed under different versions of the Phillips curve.
2Trabandt (2005) compares the Calvo model including price indexation with the sticky information model
of price-setting and finds that the indexation-augmented Calvo model does equally as well as the sticky infor-
mation model in explaining the three empirical facts discussed here.
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worker who last updated information j periods ago would thus set wages as follows
wt(j) = Et−jw∗t . (4.2)
The aggregate wage is an average of all of the wages of individual agents in the economy
indexed by j at time t:
wt = λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)jwt(j). (4.3)
In addition, Mankiw and Reis assume that the price level is given as
pt = wt − θzt (4.4)
and that output is determined by employment and productivity according to
yt = θzt + et. (4.5)
Mankiw and Reis combine the above equations and arrive at the following variant of the
sticky information Phillips curve:3
pit =
αeλ
1− λet −∆θ
z
t + λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)jEt−1−j(pit +∆θzt + αe∆et) (4.6)
Equation (4.6) illustrates the effect of sticky information on inflation dynamics in this
stylized model. First, like the standard short-run Phillips curve relationship, inflation is pos-
itively related to employment. Second, inflation is negatively related to productivity growth,
since it lowers a firm’s cost structure. Higher expected values for inflation, productivity
growth and employment growth all raise current inflation since they all increase wages and
thus prices. Mankiw and Reis (2001b) show that in the context of this sticky information
model, inflation and productivity shocks can explain much of the postwar US inflation. Koenig
(2004) investigates optimal monetary policy in the presence of sticky information, providing a
3A complete derivation of this Phillips curve is available in the appendix of Mankiw and Reis (2001b).
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more microfounded approach to wage-setting than Mankiw and Reis (2001b). Koening finds
that with sticky information wages, optimal policy involves output stabilization and inflation
stabilization.4
Mankiw and Reis (2006a, 2006b) present entire general equilibrium models based on the
sticky information rigidity existing in the firm’s price-setting decision and the household’s
wage-setting and consumption decisions. In the next section, I investigate a variant of the
sticky information model of wages presented in Mankiw and Reis (2006a) within the context
of the fully specified DSGE model presented in the previous chapter.
4.1 Sticky Information in the Labor Market
Under the Mankiw-Reis framework, the household is divided into two components. The
first component chooses consumption, real money holdings, real bond holdings, capital, the
capital utilization rate and investment. The decisions of the first component of the house-
hold can be characterized by the same first-order conditions that govern the decisions of the
Calvo-style agents in the sticky wage framework given by (3.20)–(3.25). The second compo-
nent operates with limited information in choosing its wage Wt(j). Every household has a
probability ω each period of receiving updated information. The sticky information rigidity
presented here, like the sticky wage rigidity of Chapter 3, offers the macroeconomic researcher
the advantage that it imbeds as a special case the flexible wage model. The sticky informa-
tion model collapses down to the flexible wage model when ω equals unity and there is no
informational friction.
In the absence of informational rigidities, the second component of the household would
set Wt(j) to maximize (3.17) subject to (3.18) and (3.6) as follows:
Wt(j)
Pt
=
(1 + λw)anNt(j)γn+1
ΞtNt(j)
(4.7)
If the households faces sticky information, it must set its wage based on information
4Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2003) investigate optimal monetary policy under sticky information in the firm’s
price-setting problem.
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gathered in the past. For instance, for a household that last updated its information set j
periods ago, the wage is set as follows:
Wt(j)
Pt
=
(1 + λw)Et−j(anNt(j)γn+1)
Et−j(ΞtNt(j))
(4.8)
Equation (4.8) reflects the assumption of complete markets, which implies that Ξt(j) = Ξt.
The real wage can be made stationary by dividing (4.8) by Zt.5 The households can naturally
be indexed by j, the number of time periods since they last received updated information,
and the particular form of the wage index (3.28) in this case is given by:
Wt =
ω ∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jWt(j)
1
λw
λw (4.9)
4.2 Log Linearized Model
The log-linearized Mankiw and Reis model is made up partly of equations (3.35)–(3.45)
and (3.47)–(3.53) from the baseline model. The final equation specifying the behavior of the
real wage results from combining the log-linearized labor demand condition (3.6) with the
log-linearized versions of equations (4.8) and (4.9).6
Real Wage
wˆrt =
aω
1 + (1− aω)γn 1+λwλw
mˆrst+
aω
1 + (1− aω)γn 1+λwλw
J∑
j=l
(1−ω)jEt−j(mˆrst+ γn(1 + λw)
λw
wˆrt )
(4.10)
Here aω =
(∑J
i=0(1− ω)j
)−1
is the finite-horizon counterpart of ω and ensures that the wage
index is an average of each of the wages indexed by j. This is necessary because (4.10) is
a J-period, finite horizon version of the sticky information wage condition. Equation (4.10)
reveals that, as mentioned above, the flexible wage model is actually a limiting case of the
sticky information model when ω = 1.
5I am also assuming that households observe price and the level of technology and can thus set Wt(j)
ZtPt
. In
the appendix of this chapter, I present a general derivation of the sticky information labor supply condition
under technology growth when individuals cannot observe Pt and Zt.
6The derivation of (4.10) appears in the appendix of this chapter.
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4.3 Calibration and Solution
The vector of parameters to be estimated Θcmr for the sticky information version of the
model now includes all of the parameters estimated under the flexible wage version as well
as the additional parameter ω governing the behavior of information flows in the labor mar-
ket. With the Mankiw and Reis framework, it is necessary to calculate expectations formed
in the past from the perspective of time t of current variables represented by Et−jxt, for
xt = wˆt, Lˆt, ξˆt and j = 1, ..., J . This presents a challenge when solving and estimating the
sticky information version of the model. The Klein (2000) algorithm like other standard solu-
tion algorithms (Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Uhlig (1999)) which solve rational expectation
linearized models like the flexible wage and sticky wage versions of the model of the previous
section calculates expectations of future values based on information at time t. For instance,
the Klein algorithm is able to compute Etwˆt+j in a straight-forward way, but in order to
calculate the expectations formed in the past necessary to solve the Mankiw-Reis version of
the model, the solution algorithm must be extended. Recently works have appeared in the
literature aimed at the task of solving this problem including Mankiw and Reis (2006b), Wang
and Wen (2006) and Andres et al. (2005). In order to generate the expectations formed in
the past in the sticky information framework, I extend the approach of McCallum (2001) to
a J-period case as explained further in the appendix of this chapter.
Table 4.1 reports the estimates for the sticky information version of the model using
responses from both shocks, only the policy shock and only the technology shock, respectively,
in matching model and data impulse responses. The price stickiness parameter and the degree
of price indexation to past inflation for both the two-shock case (θp = 0.914, δp = 0.891) and
the policy-shock case (θp = 0.909, δp = 0.883) fall between the parameter estimates of the
flexible wage and the sticky wage versions of the model. This indicates that less price stickiness
and persistence is necessary than under the flexible wage version of the model but more of
both is necessary than under the sticky wage model. The amount of habit persistence required
by the sticky information framework to match the responses of both shocks (h = 0.793) and
the responses of only the policy shock (h = 0.806) is higher than under the flexible wage
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framework but lower than under the sticky wage framework. The values of habit persistence,
price stickiness and price indexation, however, are all relatively close to one another across
the three versions of the model.
The estimation results for the sticky information specification’s parameters for the case of
fitting only technology responses (θp = 0.941, δp = 0.859) match up exactly with those of the
flexible wage version in the case of the technology shock, since ω, the parameter governing
information stickiness, is driven to unity, a value corresponding to fully flexible information
diffusion. In other words, if the Mankiw-Reis version of the model presented here is asked
to fit only the technology shock, it can do no better than the flexible wage version of the
model. When fitting both shocks, the degree of information rigidity is higher, with ω = 0.370
implying that wage-setters remain uninformed for an average duration of 2.7 quarters.7 The
value of ω estimated for the policy shock case (0.328) is close to the two-shock value implying
an average duration of contracts of approximately three periods. These estimated values of ω
indicate that the sticky information rigidity necessary to match a policy shock is shorter-lived
than the rigidity of the sticky wage version of the model, which as reported in Chapter 3 must
last an average of 4.3 quarters. The sticky information version of the model is unable to fit
the policy shock as well as the sticky wage version of the model with a larger J-statistic of
181.19 as compared with 142.67 from the baseline sticky wage framework.8
Figure 4.1 presents the impulse response functions for the sticky information model. For
the most part, inspection of Figure 4.1(a) reveals that the responses stay within the one
standard deviation bands, with the exception of the wage inflation and real wage series. The
real wage series, for instance, experiences a peak response that is too negative, owing to the
fact that wage growth falls relatively faster than inflation pulling down the real wage too
quickly. A comparison of Figures 3.2(a) and 4.1(a) reveals a similar performance between
the sticky wage and sticky information versions of the model in response to a policy shock.
The sticky information framework is able to improve on the performance of the flexible wage
7Mankiw and Reis (2006b) report values of ω of 0.195 and 0.210 using a maximum likelihood approach and
a Bayesian estimation approach, respectively.
8Chapter 7 presents further evidence on model comparison.
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version of the model in response to a policy shock but does poorly in matching the empirical
responses to a technology shock.
Figure 4.1(b) further illustrates the sticky information framework’s inability to match the
empirical response to a technology shock. Comparison of Figures 3.1(b) and 4.1(b) reveal
that its performance is worse than that of the flexible wage version of the model in response
to a technology shock. Most notably, the level of the real wage increases by too much too soon
relative to its empirical counterpart. The reason is that the best fit of the sticky information
version of the model in response to a technology shock would be to turn the informational
rigidity off (ω = 1). Since the model must simultaneously fit the empirical responses to policy
and technology shocks, the closest fit when including both responses in the minimization of
J involves some informational rigidity. This is because the benefit of a better fit of the model
responses to the policy shock exceeds the cost of a worse fit of the model responses to a
technology shock.
This deterioration in fit from the flexible wage version of the model in the presence of an
informational rigidity is due partly to the assumption that individuals have perfect knowledge
of the level of prices and technology when forming forecasts of future optimal wages. Thus
the dynamics in the real wage equation (4.10) must come from current values of the marginal
rate of substitution and from expectations formed in the past of the current marginal rate
of substitution. The detrended marginal rate of substitution falls relative to trend, offering
a potential source of slow adjustment of the real wage back to its long-run level. If there
is informational rigidity, however, less weight is put on this current drop in calculating the
optimal real wage and more weight is put on the expectations formed in the past of the
detrended marginal rate of substitution, which are initially zero. This causes the level of the
real wage to rise by more than it would under the flexible wage version of the model.
The results here indicate that the sticky information version of the model, in the way
that it is presented here, is able to fit the data more closely than the flexible wage version of
the model of Chapter 3 along the dimension of the policy impulse response functions. When
it comes to the technology shock responses, however, the sticky information version of the
model cannot outperform the flexible wage version of the model. This is partly due to the
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way that technology and prices are allowed to enter the information set of the household. By
assuming knowledge of the path of technology and prices, agents are better able to forecast
changes in the future optimal wage, and thus the real wage adjusts too quickly to its long-run
level following the technology shock.
A potential source of improvement, then, would be to investigate the sticky information
model in the presence of more uncertainty about the price level and technology shock by
making agents forecast future values of the price level and the technology level. The ap-
pendix to this chapter presents the general wage equation under this more pervasive form
of sticky information. As the equation shows, there appears to be an important channel for
expectations formed in the past of current inflation and technology shocks when the model
is extended in this way. It also shows the complications involved, since the researcher must
now keep track of not only expectations formed in the past of current inflation and current
technology shocks but also must keep track of expectations formed in the past of past values
of inflation and technology shocks.
Another important avenue of future investigation involves applying sticky information to
the demand side of the labor market. Just like the sticky wage version of the model presented
in Chapter 3, the sticky information version of the model looks at the friction involving
the labor market solely from the supply side of the labor market. Households are modeled
as monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor in both versions of the model, and it is
households that must navigate the friction to set wages in line with expected marginal rates
of substitution. As the original work of Mankiw and Reis (2001b) illustrates, however, the
demand side of the labor market has important implications for the dynamic behavior of
model economies in the presence of sticky information. The next two chapters build on this
insight that models of labor market rigidity should potentially consider frictions outside of
the labor supply decisions of households. These chapters turn attention away from the labor
market clearing specifications of Chapters 3 and 4 and begin looking at models that drive a
further wedge between labor demand and labor supply. The Fuhrer and Moore framework
(1995a, 1995b) and the Trigari (2004) search models of Nash bargaining and right-to manage
bargaining share the common feature that the wage is determined, at least partially, outside
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of demand and supply. This feature differs from the Calvo model of wage-setting and offers
a different set of implications for model behavior than that observed in Chapters 3 and 4.
4.4 Appendix
This appendix presents the derivation of the sticky information wage equation (4.10) and
a description of the approach used to solve the sticky information version of the model in this
chapter.
4.4.1 Sticky Information Wage Equation
To derive the sticky information wage equation, rewrite household j’s labor supply con-
dition (4.7) as follows:
Wt(j) = (1 + λw)
Nt(j)γnPt
Ξt(j)
(4.11)
The household cannot always observe the current economic conditions and so must set the
wage based on outdated information. Since the heterogeneity of households arises from in-
formational asymmetries, households can be indexed by how many periods ago they received
updated information. A household with information updated j periods ago must sets its wage
as follows:
Wt(j) = (1 + λw)Et−j
(
Nt(j)γnPt
Ξt(j)
)
(4.12)
This equation must be detrended before it can be log-linearized around its steady state.
In order to do this, both sides are divided by ZtPt giving
Wt(j)
ZtPt
= (1 + λw)
Et−j(Nt(j)γn)
ZtEt−jΞt(j)
Et−jPt
Pt
. (4.13)
The expectations can be broken apart this way, since this equation will be linearized thus al-
lowing the correlations between the variables to be ignored. The piece Et−jPtPt can be expressed
as
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Et−jPt
Pt
=
Pt−j
Pt
Et−j(Πt−j+1Πt−j+2 · · ·Πt) (4.14)
=
Et−j(Πt−j+1Πt−j+2 · · ·Πt)
(Πt−j+1Πt−j+2 · · ·Πt) .
The expression ZtEt−jΞt(j) can be expressed as
ZtEt−jΞt(j) =
Zt
Zt−j
Et−j
(
Ξt
Zt−j
Zt−j+1
Zt−j+1
Zt−j+2
· · · Zt−1
Zt
Zt
)
(4.15)
= Et−j
(
ξte
−γze−
z
t−j+1e−γze−
z
t−j+1 · · · e−γze−zt
)
eγze
z
t eγze
z
t−1 · · · eγzezt−j+1
= Et−j
(
ξte
−zt−j+1e−
z
t−j+1 · · · e−zt
)
e
z
t e
z
t−1 · · · ezt−j+1 .
Combining (4.13)–(4.15) yields
Wt(j)
PtZt
= (1+λw)
Et−j(Nt(j)γn)
Et−j
(
ξte
−zt−j+1e−
z
t−j+1 · · · e−zt
)
e
z
t e
z
t−1 · · · ezt−j+1
Et−j(Πt−j+1Πt−j+2 · · ·Πt)
(Πt−j+1Πt−j+2 · · ·Πt) .
(4.16)
Linearizing this equation results in
wˆrt (j) = γnEt−jNˆt(j)− ξˆt −
j−1∑
i=0
(
Et−j(pˆit−i − zt−i)− ((pˆit−i − zt−i))
)
, (4.17)
where ξt(j) can be replaced by ξt because of the presence of complete markets. The demand
for household j’s labor input (3.6) can be linearized as
Nˆt(j) = −1 + λw
λw
(wˆrt (j)− wˆrt ) + Lˆt. (4.18)
Combining equations (4.17) and (4.18) results in
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wˆrt (j) = γnEt−j
(
1 + λw
λw
(wˆrt − wˆrt (j))
)
+ Lˆt − ξˆt +
j−1∑
i=0
(
Et−j(pˆit−i − zt−i)− (pˆit−i − zt−i)
)
.
(4.19)
Solving (4.19) for wˆrt (j) gives
wˆrt (j) =
(
1 +
γn(1 + λw)
λw
)−1
γnEt−j
(
1 + λw
λw
wˆrt (j)
)
(4.20)
+
(
1 +
γn(1 + λw)
λw
)−1(
Lˆt − ξˆt
j−1∑
i=0
(
Et−j(pˆit−i − zt−i)− (pˆit−i − zt−i)
))
.
Linearizing the wage index (4.9) gives
wˆrt = ω
∞∑
j=0
(1− ω)jEt−jwˆrt (j). (4.21)
Combining (4.20) and (4.21) and rearranging gives the general sticky information wage
equation:
wˆrt =
ω
1 + (1− ω)γn(1+λw)λw
mˆrst (4.22)
+
ω
1 + (1− ω)γn(1+λw)λw
∞∑
j=1
(1− ω)jEt−j
(
mˆrst +
γn(1 + λw)
λw
wˆrt
)
+
ω
1 + (1− ω)γn(1+λw)λw
∞∑
j=1
(1− ω)j (Et−j(pˆit−i − zt−i)− (pˆit−i − zt−i))
where (3.51) is used to substitute in for the marginal rate of substitution. The sticky infor-
mation wage equation used in this chapter assumes that agents can observe the their own
detrended real wage, thus the term
(
Et−j(pˆit−i − zt−i)− ((pˆit−i − zt−i))
)
is dropped to arrive
at (4.10).
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4.5 Solving the Sticky Information Model
McCallum (2001) offers an example of a system of linear rational expectation equations
that contain expectations formed in the past. The example of McCallum contains only one-
period ahead forecasts, so the expectations formed in the past necessary to solve the model at
time t only involve expectations formed at time t−1. The model presented in this chapter, as
evidenced by equation (4.8), involves expectations formed j periods ago, where j = 1, 2, . . . J .
The solution algorithm presented here extends the approach of McCallum to allow for expec-
tations formed at multiple periods in the past. In general, the matrix of equations describing
the behavior of the sticky information version of the model can be written as follows:
AA

Xt
Xt−1
. . .
Xt−m+1
EtXt+1
Et−1Xt+1
. . .
Et−J+1Xt
EtXt+2
Et−1Xt+2
. . .
Et−J+2Xt+2
. . .
EtXt+J
EtXt+1
EtXt+2
. . .
EtXt+n

= BB

Xt−1
Xt−2
. . .
Xt−m
Et−1Xt
Et−2Xt
. . .
Et−JXt
Et−1Xt+1
Et−2Xt+1
. . .
Et−J+1Xt+1
. . .
Et−1Xt+J−1
Xt
EtXt+1
. . .
EtXt+n−1

+ CC · ut (4.23)
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Here, AA, BB and CC are matrices containing parameters, Xt contains the model vari-
ables, and ut contains the disturbance terms not contained in Xt and is assumed to be a
finite-variance, white noise process. Xt is formed in such a way that Xt−1 contains only
predetermined variables, and Xt contains all of the variables whose expectations formed in
the past matter for the behavior of the system at time t.9 In addition, n ≥ J needs to be
large enough for the system to contain all expectation terms of the structural model and large
enough to allow for time t forecasts of variables to be calculated at least J periods into the
future.
The endogenous state vector in (4.23) is given as
SSt =

Xt−1
Xt−2
. . .
Xt−m
Et−1Xt
Et−2Xt
. . .
Et−JXt
Et−1Xt+1
Et−2Xt+1
. . .
Et−J+1Xt+1
. . .
Et−1Xt+J−1

. (4.24)
and is made up of predetermined variables contained in them lags ofXt as well as expectations
formed in past periods. The expectations formed in the past appear in the state vector
9Since only expectations formed in the past for time t variables matter for the behavior of the sticky
information framework analyzed here, writing the system in the form of (4.23) is relatively straightforward. If
on the other hand, expectations formed in the past of future variables (Xt+1, Xt+2, . . .) matter for the behavior
of the system at time t, the form of (4.23) and the explanation presented here would have to be altered, but
the basic approach would still be valid.
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because they are predetermined as of time t. The expectations formed in the past are treated
as forecasts of current or future expectations formed from some time period in the past. The
term Et−jXt is a forecast of the current value of Xt made j periods ago. Shifting this forward
a period, a j-period ahead forecast of Xt+1 can be expressed as Et−j+1Xt+1.
The jump variables are contained in UUt and are given as
UUt =

Xt
EtXt+1
. . .
EtXt+n−1

. (4.25)
Thus the model can be written as
AA
 EtSSt+1
EtUUt+1
 = BB
 SSt
UUt
+ CC · ut (4.26)
This system of equations matches directly with the form necessary to solve the model using
the Klein (2000) algorithm. The standard rule for a stable, unique solution of (4.26) that the
number of stable eigenvalues of the solution matrix equal the number of predetermined vari-
ables (the size of SSt) applies in this case and holds for the versions of the sticky information
framework solved and estimated in this chapter.
In order to implement this algorithm, it is not possible for the state vector to be infinite
in size. I restrict the state vector by including expectations formed in the past as long as
they affect the wage equation more than some tolerance level. In particular, if the addition
of forecasts formed j periods ago affects the reduced form of the system by less than some
tolerance level, then only expectations formed from j − 1 periods in the past and later are
included in the state vector. The upper bound of J = 20 is used, since this is the number of
periods used in the impulse response experiments, and so all expectation terms formed more
than 20 periods ahead would remain zero for the duration of the experiment. So while this
exclusion changes slightly the relative weight on those expectation terms formed in the past,
this effect should be small.
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In order to verify that the approach presented here truly solves equations (3.35)–(3.50), I
compute the reduced form solution to the system in (4.26), given generally as:
SSt+1 = G · SSt +H · ut (4.27)
UUt = D · SSt + F · ut. (4.28)
This implies that
UUt+1 = D · SSt+1 = D ·G · SSt +D ·H · ut. (4.29)
Next, I initialize the state vector at SS0 and the exogenous shock vector at u0 and generate
simulated data under the law of motion given by the reduced form solution (4.26). The specific
type of simulation considered here is the impulse response function in which an element of
either the shock vector ut or the state vector SSt is pulsed at time 0. The values of UU0, SS1
and UU1 are calculated according to equations (4.27)–(4.29) as follows:
SS1 = G · SS0 +H · u0 (4.30)
UU0 = D · SS0 (4.31)
UU1 = D ·G · SS0 +D ·H · u0. (4.32)
The system can be recursively simulated by iterating on equation (4.32). In order to verify
that (4.27) and (4.28) provide a solution to the system, I take the calculated paths of SSt,
UUt and EtUUt+1 at a given parameter vector and plug them back into zero-valued versions
of the structural equations (3.35)–(3.45), (3.47)–(3.53) and (4.10). Values can be calculated
for each time period of the simulation. If the values are negligibly different from zero, this
indicates evidence that the approach does provide a solution to the structural equations. I find
that the largest absolute value arising from any of the equations across both the technology
and policy shock simulations for the case when the parameter vector is set to minimize the
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distance between the model and empirical responses to both of these shocks for the forecast
horizon J = 20 is of order 10−13.10 This is evidence that the solution is valid.
10The largest forecast horizon is J = 18 for the case of fitting responses to both shocks, J = 20 for the case
of fitting only responses to the policy shock and J = 0 for fitting only responses to the technology shock.
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Table 4.1: Parameter Estimates – Sticky Information Model
Sticky Information Model
Shock
Param Pol, Tech Pol Tech
θp 0.914 0.909 0.941
(0.174) (0.084) (0.363)
δp 0.891 0.883 0.859
(0.323) (0.268) (2.828)
h 0.793 0.806 0.807
(0.239) (0.121) (0.052)
ω 0.370 0.328 1.000
(0.356) (0.183) (–)
J 448.28 181.19 212.29
J with ut 594.02 293.06 246.17
Note: Columns two through four provide para-
meter estimates and standard errors (in paren-
theses) for the sticky wage model. The columns
specify which shocks are used to fit the model to
the data when generating parameter estimates.
The second-to-last row provides the measure of
goodness-of-fit expressed in equation (3.57) of the
estimated model when unemployment responses
are not used in fitting the model to the data, while
the last row provides the goodness-of-fit measure
when unemployment responses are used to fit the
model to the data. Entries of – denote values that
were not estimated. A parameter estimate with a
standard error value reported as – indicates that
the parameter estimate was driven to a lower or
upper bound.
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Figure 4.1: Mankiw-Reis Model Impulse Responses
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Chapter 5
Staggered Contracting Model
Several works in the macroeconomic literature have relied on staggered contracts in the
labor market to explain macroeconomic movements and the effects of monetary policy. This
chapter reviews some of the major contributions in this area of model development and nests
an updated staggered contracting framework based on the work of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,
1995b) into the DSGE model of Chapter 3. The resulting model is used to investigate the
effects of staggered contracting on the dynamic behavior of macroeconomic variables within
the model.
5.1 Fischer’s Model of Long-Term Contracts
Fischer (1977) introduces his model of long-term contracts in order to explain that mon-
etary policy can affect real output, even when rational expectations are taken into account.
To accomplish this, Fischer sets out a model that involves two-period contracts, where the
nominal wage is set in an attempt to maintain a constant real wage. In Fischer’s model, this
is the same as maintaining constancy of employment and labor income. Fischer takes the
nominal wage as predetermined throughout each period, since it is known at the beginning
of the period, while output and the price level are determined during the period. To begin
his analysis, Fischer sets out a one-period contract model, to illustrate the necessity of a
multi-period contracting framework to explain the non-neutrality of money. The simplified
one-period specification of Fischer’s model looks as follows:
xt = Et−1pt (5.1)
Y st = (pt − xt) + ut (5.2)
Y dt =Mt − pt − vt (5.3)
Mt =
∞∑
i=1
aiut−i +
∞∑
i=1
bivt−i (5.4)
ut = ρ1ut−1 + ut (5.5)
vt = ρ2vt−1 + vt , (5.6)
where xt is the log of the nominal contract price negotiated at time t− 1, pt is the log of the
price level, Y st is the log of output, Y
d
t is the log of output demanded, and Mt is the log of
the money stock.
Equation (5.1) represents the desire of agents to keep the expected real wage constant
over the period that the contract is in effect and also models a markup factor from wages
to prices of unity. Equation (5.2) represents the aggregate supply curve, with the supply of
output taken to be a decreasing function of the real wage. The demand side of the model
is represented by (5.3), which comes from a quantity theory of money specification. Fischer
introduces a stabilizing role for monetary policy with the disturbance terms ut and vt. Both
of these disturbances follow a first-order autoregressive process as described in (5.5) and (5.6),
where ut and 
ν
t are assumed to be mutually and serially uncorrelated white noise error terms.
In order to solve this model, Fischer substitutes (5.1) into (5.2) and sets the resulting equation
equal to (5.3), which assumes that the price level adjusts each period to equate supply and
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demand. After some manipulation, this gives
pt =
1
2
Mt +
1
2
Et−1pt − 12(ut + vt). (5.7)
Passing the expectations operator dated at time t− 1 through this equation yields1
Et−1pt =
1
2
Mt +
1
2
Et−1pt − 12Et−1(ut + vt). (5.8)
Subtracting (5.8) from (5.7) and plugging the result back into the expression for the supply
of output yields the following reduced form equation:
Yt =
1
2
(ut − νt ) + ρ1ut−1 (5.9)
From (5.8), it is evident that the monetary policy parameters ai and bi do not affect output.
With one-period contracts, money is neutral and private agents know what the money supply
will be at the beginning of the period. In order to overturn this neutrality of money result,
Fischer extends the analysis to a multi-period contracting framework. Agents engaged in
multi-period contracts give up a degree of flexibility in responding optimally to economic
changes that occur over the life of the contracts. Thus, the justification of these longer-
term contracting schemes must rely on private agents’ desires to avoid the costs associated
with more frequent contract negotiations. The contracting specification in Fischer’s model
is staggered. In the two-period case, this means that during any given period, half of the
employed labor force is under contracts created at the beginning of the previous period and
the other half is working under contracts created at the beginning of the current period.
Nominal wages in the two-period case are still set to maintain constancy in the expected real
wage, but in this case each contract has to specify two expected real wages as follows:
xt−i+1 = Et−ipt, i = 1, 2 (5.10)
On the goods side of the economy, half of the firms at time t are operating in the first
1Mt is known with certainty at time t− 1 because of the assumed form of (5.4).
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year of a labor contract created at the end of t− 1 and the other half are operating under the
last year of a contract drawn up at the end of t− 2. Aggregate supply is now given by
Y st =
1
2
2∑
i=1
(pt − xt−i+1) + ut. (5.11)
In each period, there is still only a single price for output, and aggregate demand is still
represented by (5.3) above. In this case, equating aggregate supply and demand corresponds
with equating (5.11) with (5.3). After some manipulation, this gives the following expression:
pt =
1
2
Mt +
1
4
Et−1pt +
1
4
Et−2pt − 12(ut − vt) (5.12)
Passing the expectations operator at t − 1 and t − 2 through (5.12) gives the following ex-
pressions:
Et−1pt =
2
3
Mt +
1
3
Et−2Mt − 13Et−2(ut + vt)−
2
3
Et−1(ut + vt) (5.13)
Et−2pt = Et−2Mt − Et−2(ut + vt) (5.14)
Plugging (5.13) and (5.14) into (5.12) yields
pt =
2
3
Mt +
1
3
Et−2Mt +
1
2
(ut + vt) +
1
6
Et−1(ut + vt)− 13Et−2(ut + vt). (5.15)
Plugging (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15) into (5.2) gives the following expression:
Yt =
Mt − Et−2Mt
3
+
1
2
(ut − vt) + 16Et−1(ut + vt) +
1
3
Et−2(ut + vt) (5.16)
Fischer again uses the same money supply rule characterized by (5.4) in the multi-period case
and obtains the following expression for the difference between the actual money supply in
period t and the supply as predicted two periods earlier:
Mt − Et−2Mt = a1ut−1 + b1νt−1 (5.17)
Substituting (5.17) into (5.16) and manipulating the resulting expression gives
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Yt =
1
2
(t − ηt) + 13
[
ut−1(a1 + 2ρ1) + 
ν
t−1(b1 − ρ2)
]
+ ρ21ut−2. (5.18)
With the presence of the parameters a1 and b1 in (5.18), it is evident that monetary policy
has an effect on output in the multi-period version of Fischer’s model. The reason that these
parameters from the money supply equation affect output is because in between the time that
the two-period contract is drawn up and entered into and the final year of the contract, there
is a window where the monetary policymaker can react. If there is a shock in the first period
of the contract, the policymaker can use policy to react to the shock and thus affect the real
wage and output in the second period of the contract. By introducing multi-period labor
contracts into his framework, Fischer provides an element of wage rigidity and an avenue
where money and monetary policy can have effects on real output.
5.2 Taylor’s Overlapping Contracts Model
Taylor (1980) uses an overlapping contracts model to explain how serial correlations can
explain persistent movements in output and unemployment.2 One result of Taylor’s model
is to provide a framework of price persistence. Taylor lays out two key assumptions for his
work: first, wage contracts are staggered, and second, when firms and workers negotiate a
contract, they look at wages that will be in effect at other firms over the life of the contract.
The latter assumption implies that when negotiating nominal wages, agents will look both
backward and forward at wages and expected wages, respectively, when making contracting
decisions.
The contracts in Taylor’s model are assumed to specify a fixed nominal wage rate that
will apply over the duration of the contract. Taylor’s multi-period contracting specification
makes the current wage contract an average of past wages and future expected wages, with
an adjustment for excess demand. The equations representing the current wage, the markup
of prices over wages, and inflation for the two-period version of Taylor’s framework are as
2Unlike the Trigari (2004) model of the next chapter, the Taylor model does not offer a microfounded
explanation of unemployment. Instead, Taylor assumes that unemployment and output are inversely related
in the model.
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follows:
xt =
1
2
(xt−1 + Etxt+1) +
γ
2
(yˆt + Etyˆt+1) (5.19)
pt =
1
2
(xt + xt−1) (5.20)
pit = pt − pt−1 (5.21)
where, xt is now the nominal contract price negotiated at time t, yˆt is excess demand, and pit
is the net rate of inflation.
Equation (5.19) represents the desire of firms and workers to take into account all of
the other wages that will be in play in the economy over the life of the contract. The excess
demand term comes from the assumption that the current wage is increasing relative to wages
set in other periods with the level of economic activity. Thus, the agents in Taylor’s model are
interested in their relative position compared with other agents in the model. Equation (5.20)
expresses price as a constant markup over the average wage that firm’s face in the current
period. A fraction of the workers at a firm are under contracts negotiated at the beginning
of the current period, with the remainder of the workers under contracts negotiated at the
beginning of the previous period.
Plugging (5.19) into (5.20) and rearranging gives3
pt =
1
2
(pt−1 + Etpt+1) +
γ
2
(2yˆt + yˆt−1 + Etyˆt+1). (5.22)
Equation (5.22) reveals that the Taylor specification contains a channel for the slow ad-
justment of prices with the inclusion of the pt−1 term. Since wages and prices are linked
through the markup rule expressed in (5.20), this price stickiness also implies a degree of
nominal wage stickiness. Rearranging (5.22) and substituting in (5.21) provides the following
3In the presentation and explanation of the two-period versions of the Taylor model in this section and
the Fuhrer and Moore model in the next section, I make the simplifying assumptions that Et−1yˆt = yˆt and
Et−1xt = xt. This simplifies the algebra but does not affect the fundamental properties of either of the models.
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expression for the Taylor model’s implications for inflation:
pit = Etpit+1 + γ(2yˆt + Etyˆt+1 + yˆt−1) (5.23)
This form is exactly the same basic form that arises from the Calvo model of price-setting
in the intermediate goods market with no price indexation. As described in Chapter 1 this
version of the Phillips curve is unable to generate inflation persistence or a trade-off between
inflation and output stabilization. Fuhrer and Moore criticize the Taylor model on exactly
these grounds, pointing out that the inflation persistence derived from this model can only
come from persistence in the behavior of the driving term yˆt (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a). In
other words, a one period shock to output in Taylor’s model will affect inflation for one period
only. Taylor’s contracting specification provides no persistence of inflation on its own. If the
shock to output or output itself does not display persistent behavior, neither will inflation.
Fuhrer and Moore consider this is an empirical failure for the model because as they explain
and as shown in response to a monetary policy shock in Chapter 2, the data for the US
economy exhibits a significant degree of inflation persistence.
This shortcoming of the model implies that inflation can be costlessly reduced with no
impact on real output. To illustrate, if the economy were initially at a relatively high inflation
rate of pi0, demand was at its equilibrium level, and the monetary authority wanted to move
the inflation rate to the lower level of pi1, as long as expectations of the future inflation rate
were pi1, equation (5.23) would become
pi1 = pi1 + γ(yˆt + yˆt+1). (5.24)
This implies a value of yˆt+ yˆt+1 of zero, and inflation can be reduced without affecting output.
5.3 Fuhrer and Moore Model
To correct for the perceived shortcomings of the Taylor model, Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,
1995b) set out a framework where agents care about relative real wages over the duration of
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the wage contract. As in the Taylor model, agents set contract prices in a staggered fashion as
a function of past contract prices negotiated in previous periods or expected future contract
prices to be negotiated in later periods. Unlike in the Taylor model, however, agents care
about the real value of the contract price, not just the nominal value. Fuhrer and Moore
provide the following expression for the negotiated real contract price to parallel (5.19) in
Taylor’s model for a two-period version of their model:
xt − pt = 12(xt−1 − pt−1) +
1
2
(Et(xt+1 − pt+1)) + γ2 (yˆt + Etyˆt+1) (5.25)
Fuhrer and Moore arrive at this formula by defining an index, vt, of average real wages
specified in contracts that are in effect at time t:
vt =
1
2
(xt − pt) + 12(xt−1 − pt−1) (5.26)
Agents attempt to negotiate a real wage that is equal to the expected average of all of the
other indices that will be in effect over the life of the contract plus an allowance for deviation
from this average to reflect current and expected future movements in output:
xt − pt = 12(vt + Etvt+1) +
κ
2
(yˆt + Etyˆt+1)
=
1
2
(
1
2
(xt − pt) + 12(xt−1 − pt−1) +
1
2
(xt+1 − pt+1) + 12(xt − pt)
)
+
κ
2
(yˆt + Etyˆt+1)
=
1
4
(xt−1 − pt−1 + 2(xt + pt) + Et(xt+1 − pt+1)) + κ2 (yˆt + Etyˆt+1) (5.27)
Solving this for xt − pt gives
xt − pt = 12 (xt−1 − pt−1 + Et(xt+1 − pt+1)) + κ(yˆt + Etyˆt+1). (5.28)
Equation (5.28) can be reconciled with (5.25) by equating κ with γ2 . Fuhrer and Moore
emphasize that the contracts are still negotiated in nominal terms like in the Taylor model but
with an attempt to maintain constancy in the relative real wage. Fuhrer and Moore suggest
that it is more plausible to think that agents negotiate wage contracts to keep up with the
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relative wages of others than to keep up with their nominal wages. The representative firm’s
workers are distributed evenly over the currently active contracts, and the firm’s price is set
according to the same markup equation (5.20) as in the Taylor model. This mark-up rule
specifies a firm’s price to be the average of wages being paid under currently active contracts.
Rearranging (5.25), combining it with (5.20) and expressing it in first differences of xt yields
∆xt =
1
2
(pit+1 + Etpit) +
γ
2
(yˆt + Etyˆt+1) (5.29)
Inflation can be written in terms of first differences of xt by taking the first difference of
equation (5.20):
pit =
1
2
(∆xt −∆xt−1) (5.30)
Combining (5.29) and (5.30) leads to the following Phillips curve relationship:4
pit =
1
2
(pit−1 + Etpit+1) +
γ
2
(2yˆt + Etyˆt+1 + yˆt−1) (5.31)
Equation (5.31) indicates that in the Fuhrer and Moore model, inflation now depends on
its past values as well as its future values. Thus, this framework provides significant inertia
to the inflation rate outside of the inertia in the excess demand term. A one-time shock to
inflation or output will now have a longer lasting effect than in the Taylor model. This result
matches more closely the pattern that is observed in the US data. With this specification,
Fuhrer and Moore are able to provide a framework that supports a Phillip’s curve relationship
between output and inflation containing both leads and lags of inflation.
According to Fuhrer and Moore (1995b), another consequence of the distinction between
the Fuhrer and Moore model and the Taylor model outside of inflation persistence is that
disinflations will proceed in dramatically different ways under each of the models. Unlike in the
Taylor model, Fuhrer and Moore claim that disinflations in their model will be contractionary.
4Just as with the Taylor model of the previous section, I assume for algebraic simplicity that Et−1yt = yt
and Et−1xt = xt. These assumptions do not affect the fundamental properties of the two-period Fuhrer and
Moore model.
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This claim, however, hinges on an algebraic error in their original derivation. To arrive at the
actual implications for a disinflation in the Fuhrer and Moore model, equation (5.31) can be
rewritten as
Et(pit+1 − pit)− (pit − pit−1) = −γ(2yˆt + Etyˆt+1 + yˆt−1) (5.32)
Here, when the excess demand term yˆt is negative, it implies that et ceteris paribus the
change in inflation will be positive, the opposite of what is claimed by Fuhrer and Moore
(1995b). The actual mechanism governing the relationship between excess demand and in-
flation in this model, however, stems from the way contracts handle excess demand. When
excess demand is negative current contracts and current inflation respond by more than future
contracts and future inflation will because of the staggered nature of contracts. Thus current
inflation changes more negatively than future inflation, leading to a negative relationship
between excess demand and the change in inflation.
The actual framework that appears in the analysis of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b)
is a four-period specification that looks as follows:
pt =
3∑
i=0
fixt−i (5.33)
fi = 0.25 + (1.5− i)s (5.34)
νt ≡
3∑
i=0
fi(xt−i − pt−i) (5.35)
xt − pt =
3∑
i=0
fiEt(νt+i + γyˆt+i) (5.36)
Equation (5.33) parallels (5.20) above with firms now setting prices taking into account
four periods of contracts, with the latest contract negotiated at the beginning of the current
period and the earliest negotiated three periods earlier at t−3. The weights on each contract
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in (5.35), though, are no longer symmetric as in (5.26) for each period but follow a functional
form as specified by equation (5.34) and governed by the parameter 0 ≤ s ≤ 1/6. In general,
when s 6= 0, firms put more weight on more recently negotiated contracts. When s = 0, each
contract receives equal symmetric weights that matching up with the rectangular distribution
of the Taylor model given in (5.20). When s = 1/6, contracts follows a triangular distribution.
Equation (5.35) is a modified version of (5.26) above and represents the index of average
real wages specified in contracts that are in effect at time t. Again the weights are no longer
symmetric for each of the lags of νt, since fi is used as the weighting function. Equation (5.36)
matches up with (5.27) above, with agents setting the current nominal contract price so that
the current real contract price equals the weighted average of the real contract price indices
expected to be in effect over the duration of the contract. Fuhrer and Moore also include an
adjustment term for excess demand in each of the periods of the contract in equation (5.36),
with the weighting function again specified by fi. Since (5.36) is a forward-looking equation,
the functional form of fi now states that more recent contracts are given a higher weight than
are contracts negotiated later when setting the current contract price. Fuhrer and Moore
substitute (5.35) into (5.36) to obtain5
xt − pt =
3∑
i=1
βi(xt−i − pt−i) +
3∑
i=1
βiEt(xt+i − pt+i) + γ∗
3∑
i=0
fiEtyˆt+i. (5.37)
Fuhrer and Moore combine the contracting specification with an IS curve and a monetary
policy reaction function to represent the US economy. They analyze the movements of the
variables implied by this structural model and use it to investigate policy issues.
Fuhrer and Moore’s contracting specification has been attacked for resting on unreason-
able assumptions that drive its inflation persistence results. One criticism of the Fuhrer and
Moore model comes from Roberts (1997) who notes that the Fuhrer and Moore model is ob-
servationally equivalent to a model with sticky prices and expectations that are imperfectly
rational. Roberts augments the Taylor model with these imperfect expectations and shows
that when the Taylor model is specified this way, it also can generate inflation persistence.
5The coefficients βi and γ
∗in (5.37) are given by βi =
P3−i
j=0 fjfj+i/(1−
P3
j=0 f
2
j ) and γ
∗ = γ/(1−P3j=0 f2j ).
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Roberts defines the new expectations as an average of rational expectations and an extrap-
olation of the previous period’s inflation rate. Thus, Roberts replaces the Etpit+1 term in
equation (5.23) of Taylor’s model with 12(pit−1 + Etpit+1). The inflation specification of the
augmented Taylor model now becomes
pit =
1
2
(pit−1 + Etpit+1) + γ(2yˆt + yt−1 + Etyt+1), (5.38)
which matches the form of equation (5.31) in the Fuhrer and Moore model. This modified
Taylor model is also capable of providing a rationale for a two-sided Phillip’s curve. Thus,
Roberts proposes that inflation persistence can be explained by the price stickiness of the
Taylor model in combination with imperfectly rational expectations.
Driscoll and Holden (2001, 2003) provide another attack on the Fuhrer and Moore model
by arguing that only by allowing for the agents in their model to care about real wages that
others have received in the past, are Fuhrer and Moore able to support inflation persistence.
Driscoll and Holden further argue that if the agents only care about real wages that are
currently being received, what they call a “more reasonable assumption”, then the inflation
persistence result is lost, and the Fuhrer and Moore model behaves like the unmodified Taylor
model.
Driscoll and Holden question why the agents in the Fuhrer and Moore model would care
about the real wage earned by workers last period (xt−1−pt−1). They point out that it would
be more realistic for these agents to compare their real wages with the current real wages
being earned by those workers who negotiated earlier nominal wage contracts that are still in
effect (xt−1 − pt). Driscoll and Holden also replace the Fuhrer and Moore assumption that
the real contract price to be determined is the first period real contract price with what they
term the more “theoretically preferable” assumption of the desired real contract price being
a weighted expected real contract price over the entire contract period. Thus, they substitute
in the expected real wage xt − 12(pt + Etpt+1) for xt − pt in the two-period Fuhrer-Moore
specification and end up with
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xt − 12(pt + Etpt+1) =
1
2
(xt−1 − pt + Et(xt+1 − pt+1)) + γ2 (yˆt + Etyˆt+1). (5.39)
However, the prices in the above equation cancel out, leaving the equation
xt =
1
2
(xt−1 + Etxt+1) +
γ
2
(yˆt + Etyˆt+1). (5.40)
This mirrors equation (5.19) presented earlier in the Taylor model where nominal wages were
set as the expected average of the other nominal wages that would be in effect over the life
of the contract. Thus, Driscoll and Holden are able to overturn the inflation persistence
result of Fuhrer and Moore by analyzing the staggered contracting model under alternative
assumptions of the contracting behavior of wage-setting agents.
5.4 Staggered Contracting in General Equilibrium
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) present their model of staggered contracting in an attempt
to explain the persistent behavior of inflation. The Fuhrer and Moore model succeeds in
explaining this persistence by assuming that real contract prices are set as an average of
the real contract prices of other agents expected to be active over the life of the contract
as explained above. Although, the Fuhrer and Moore model is not designed as a model of
labor market dynamics, this section takes seriously the efforts of Fuhrer and Moore and nests
the staggered real wage contracting framework within the dynamic general equilibrium model
presented in Chapter 3.
In the staggered contracting framework analyzed here, wage-setters are divided up into
four groups, each taking turns, one each quarter, setting the wage for their group. Firms and
households know that the real wage is determined this way and make labor supply and labor
demand decisions based on the real wage that results from this process. It is assumed that
households are made up of a continuum of agents, and that complete markets allow for the
separation of wage choices and other choices by the household. Here, I present a non-linear
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version of the staggered contracting specification to match with the other nonlinear dynamic
labor market frameworks of Chapters 3 and 4.6
The building block of the Fuhrer-Moore model is the index Vt, which serves as a weighted
average of contract prices that are being paid at time t. As Driscoll and Holden (2001, 2003)
point out and as discussed above, although Xt−i for i = 0, . . . , 3 represents the contract prices
being paid at time t, Vt does not contain the real contract prices being paid at time t (nor the
detrended real contract prices for the case of the model presented here). The reason is because
in order to capture the actual real contract prices, the elements of Vt should be divided by
the current price level (or the current price and technology level in this case), not the price
level at the time of contract negotiation. The form of Vt presented in (5.41), however, is a
valid form if individuals are assumed to care about what their wages can buy them relative
to what other contracted individuals have bought or will buy. This is in a very direct sense
a “keeping up with the Joneses” style approach. I explore two alternative ways to treat this
index below.
5.4.1 Indexation with Technology Growth
The first approach assumes that agents set wages relative to technology growth, so that
the index looks as follows:
Vt =
3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Zt−iPt−i
)fi
, (5.41)
where fi = 0.25+(1.5−i)s, and 0 < s ≤ 1/6, as in the original Fuhrer and Moore specification.
In this framework, agents setting their contract price Xt at time t do so as an average
of these indices and also take into account a measure of business cycle conditions or excess
demand. The resulting contracting equation is given as7
6In this section I follow the approach of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b) by assuming that contracts
are only fixed for four periods. A more general approach would be to allow the data to determine how long
contracts last by testing the model under alternative durations of contract length and choosing the duration
resulting in the closest fit of the model with the data. I assume here that a duration of four periods, however,
adequately captures the dynamics of the staggered contracting specification.
7Alternatively, the contracting price could have been written in terms of detrended output as Xt
ZtPt
=
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Xt
ZtPt
=
3∏
i=0
Et
(
V fit+i
)
yt+i
γfi . (5.42)
Equations (5.41) and (5.42) assume that individuals set their real contract price based on
productivity concerns. When the level of technology Zt is higher, so too is labor productivity
and agents set a higher real contract price XtPt . In addition to this source of trend growth in
real contract prices, (5.42) also allows for the real contract price to change with changes in
detrended output arising from the presence of γ, which is assumed to be greater than or equal
to zero. This is a feature of the original Fuhrer and Moore model as reflected in equations
(5.25) and (5.36).
Fuhrer and Moore label the output term in their model as an excess demand term, since
output behavior in their model is governed by an IS relation. In the current work, yt+i
represents detrended output, and its presence in (5.42) indicates that as detrended output
rises, so too does the currently negotiated real contract price. In the log-linearized model, the
deviations of the currently negotiated detrended real contract price from its detrended steady
state depend positively on deviations of detrended output from its detrended steady state.
The motivation of this procyclical term in (5.42) cannot be justified by trend productivity
concerns, since higher productivity is implicitly rewarded by the presence of Zt on the left-
hand side of the equation as mentioned above and because the yt+i terms are detrended. An
alternative way to motivate a higher contract price in response to a higher value of detrended
output is by appealing to the same implicit argument made by Taylor (1980) that as output
increases relative to trend, unemployment decreases and labor market tightness increases.
The laborers are thus in a relative position of power and can negotiate a higher real contract
price. When γ = 0 in (5.42), agents do not take into account output concerns when contract
prices are negotiated. This is one of the cases analyzed further below and one that illuminates
the mechanisms in play within the staggered contracting framework.
Q3
i=0 Et

V fit+i

Y fit+i. In this case, γ is constrained to be equal to unity, so that the model can be detrended.
This approach also introduces leads of the technology shock into the log-linearized model arising from the
detrending of the Yt+i terms, but since the technology shock is assumed to be a serially uncorrelated white
noise disturbance, these terms will not matter for the dynamic behavior of the model.
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In this framework, the detrended real contract price
xt =
Xt
ZtPt
(5.43)
is stationary as is Vt.
Firms hire the individual labor components according to the labor demand condition (3.6),
and labor is aggregated according to (3.8), thus wages are aggregated according to the same
general form given by equation (3.7), with the particular form given as
Wt =
[
X
1
λw
t +X
1
λw
t−1 +X
1
λw
t−2 +X
1
λw
t−3
]λw
. (5.44)
5.4.2 Indexation without Technology Growth
The second approach to constructing the index Vt assumes that agents set relative wages
without regard to productivity growth as follows:
Vt =
3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Pt−i
)fi
(5.45)
The contracting equation takes on a form analogous to (5.42), given as
Xt
Pt
=
3∏
i=0
Et
(
V fit+i
)
yt+i
γfi . (5.46)
Here xt = XtZtPt is again stationary, so that
Xt
Pt
and Vt must both be detrended by Zt to be
made stationary. The aggregate wage equation (5.44) remains the same for this version of
the model.
5.5 Staggered Contracting Log Linearized Model
The log-linearized staggered contracting model is made up of equations (3.35)–(3.45) and
(3.47)–(3.52) from the baseline model, with the additional equations below:
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Real Contract Price under Indexation with Technology Growth
xˆt =
3∑
i=1
βfi xˆt−i +
3∑
i=1
βfi xˆt+i + γ
∗
3∑
i=0
fiEtyˆt+i (5.47)
Real Contract Price under Indexation without Technology Growth
xˆt =
3∑
i=1
βfi xˆt−i +
3∑
i=1
βfi xˆt+i +
2∑
i=0
γfi 
z
t−i +
3∑
i=1
δfi 
z
t+i + γ
∗
3∑
i=0
fiEtyˆt+i (5.48)
Real Wage
wˆrt =
3∑
i=0
φfi xˆt−i +
2∑
i=0
θfi (pˆit−i + 
z
t−i) (5.49)
where the coefficients in equations (5.47)–(5.49) are defined as follows:
βfi =
∑3−i
j=0 fjfj+i
1−∑3j=0 f2j (5.50)
γfi = −
∑2−i
j=0 fj
∑2
k=i+j fk+1
1−∑3j=0 f2j (5.51)
δfi =
∑3−i
j=0 fj+i(1−
∑3
k=j+1 fk)
1−∑3j=0 f2j (5.52)
γ∗ =
γ
1−∑3j=0 f2j (5.53)
φfi =
(
(p¯ieγz)3−i∑3
j=0(p¯ieγ)j
) 1
λw
(5.54)
θfi = −
(
(
∑2
k=i(p¯ie
γz)
2−k
λw )λw∑3
j=0(p¯ieγ)j
) 1
λw
(5.55)
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5.6 Calibration and Solution
This section presents the minimum distance parameterization and impulse responses for
three versions of the staggered contracting framework. The versions of the model with and
without indexation to technology in contracts are both analyzed for the case when the para-
meter governing the cyclicality of contract prices γ is allowed to vary. In addition, the case
when γ is set to zero is analyzed under contracts with technology indexation. In general, the
parameter vector to be estimated for the staggered contracting model Θcsc is identical to that
of the baseline model with the addition of the contract weighting coefficient s and the cyclical
component parameter in the real contract price equation γ.8 The Fuhrer and Moore version
of the model is estimated using the same responses used in the previous versions of the three
models.
5.6.1 Case 1: Technology-Indexed Contracts with γ = 0
The first case analyzed involves technology-indexed contracts with the procylical channel
in the contracting equation shut off (γ = 0). The value of s used to change the relative
weights on past and future contract prices in the bargaining framework does not affect the
impulse response functions in this case as explained below, and thus no estimated value of s
is reported.
Table 5.1 reports the parameter estimates for the elements of Θcsc under this first case.
The values of θp are lower here than under the other labor market frameworks of Chapters
8The fixed cost parameter Φ is also estimated for the case where contracts are indexed to technology and
γ = 0. The reason for the estimation of Φ in this case is that in estimation attempts that involved calibrating
Φ as in the versions of the model in Chapter 3 and 4 to guarantee that profits are zero in the steady state, the
model was numerically unstable and unsolvable. The fixed cost parameter Φ in this version of the staggered
contracting model displays different behavior than under any other model. The value Φ enters directly in
both the staggered contracting version and the baseline Calvo version of the log-linearized model only through
equation (3.48) describing aggregate supply. The only difference between the staggered contracting version of
the model and the flexible wage version of the model is that the real wage in the staggered contracting version
of the model is determined outside of the supply and demand of labor. The labor demand is still the same
under the staggered contracting version compared with the baseline sticky wage version of the model, but the
labor supply does not enter into the determination of the equilibrium of the model. Thus, for instance, the
parameter γn does not determine at all the behavior of the model. This difference means that the behavior of
the factor markets is fundamentally altered and this version of the staggered contracting model is no longer
stable when Φ is calibrated to induce zero profits for the intermediate goods firm under certain parameter
combinations.
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3 and 4. The value using responses from both shocks is 0.624, implying an average duration
of price contracts of 2.7 quarters, and the value using only the technology shock responses is
0.893, implying an average duration of 9.3 quarters. The estimate for the approach using only
the policy shock is insignificant and equal to 0.363. The estimates of δp are between 0.007 and
0.71, relatively low values when compared with the versions of the model estimated in the
previous two chapters. The habit persistence parameter stays between 0.78 and 0.82 across
each of the estimation approaches, a value lower than the versions of the model presented in
Chapters 3 and 4. The value of Φ was driven to zero in each of the estimation approaches
reported in Table 5.2.
The results from this version of the staggered contracting specification results stem from
the behavior of real contract prices. The linearized detrended contract price variable xˆt does
not respond at all to a policy or technology shock, since according to (5.47), it is just a function
of leads and lags of itself. Thus, the contracting specification results in a completely fixed real
contract price relative to its trend, and the parameter s does not matter for the transmission
of technology and policy shocks. This means that the real wage is just a negative function of
current and lagged values of inflation and current and lagged values of the technology shock.
Combining equation (5.49) with (3.35) and (3.36) and setting the responses of the contract
prices to zero delivers the following Phillips curve relationship:
pˆit =
(1− θpβ)(1− θp)
(1 + (1− α)θf0 )θp(1 + δpβ)
(
αrˆkt − (1− α)
2∑
i=1
θfi pˆit−i − (1− α)
2∑
i=0
zt−i
)
+
1
1 + (1− α)θf0
(
δp
1 + δpβ
pˆit−1 +
β
1 + δpβ
Etpˆit+1
)
(5.56)
This shows that the driving force for inflation is the behavior of the real rental rate and
the technology shock. As illustrated in Figure 5.1(a), when the interest rate rises, investment
and consumption fall, lowering the amount of output produced and shifting in the demand for
capital and labor. The real rental rate for capital falls and thus inflation falls. Since the real
wage is a negative function of inflation as specified in (5.56), it experiences a counterfactual
rise. The responses of output and hours, like the real wage, also exhibit a poor fit, with swings
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too great in magnitude and too long departed from zero to match with empirical responses.
This occurs because the rise in the real wage severely lowers the quantity of labor demanded
and compounds the decrease in labor demand due to the fall in the real rental rate and the
level of capital. With labor lowered, output too is lowered but only by a fraction of the
decrease in labor demand. Thus labor productivity actually sees an increase.
While the relative contracting framework in this case is unable to match up with the
stylized facts involving a shock to policy, due to the form of (5.56), it fares much better in
matching the responses to a technology shock. Figure 5.1(b) shows that in response to a
permanent increase in labor productivity, all of the variables have the right initial sign and,
for the most part, the right initial magnitude. On impact of the technology shock, since the
level of price stickiness is low, inflation is driven down, as is the wage since they both depend
negatively on the technology shock, and the real rental rate is driven up. The amount of
capital relative to its trend is also driven down, and so labor demand falls despite the fall in
the detrended real wage. As capital begins to rise, and the detrended real wage continues to
stay negative due to its indirect relationship with inflation and lagged technology shocks, the
deviation of labor demand becomes positive and stays so for an extended period, matching
up well with the empirical hours series. Since the real rental rate of capital is slow to return
to its starting level and the detrended real wage series begins to die quickly down to zero, the
inflation series becomes positive before dying out.
5.6.2 Case 2: Technology-Indexed Contracts with γ 6= 0
The next case analyzed involves technology-indexed contracts when currently negotiated
real contract prices are allowed to vary with current and expected future deviations of de-
trended output from its steady state. The parameter estimates for this case are reported in
the last three columns of Table 5.1. Although the value of γ, the parameter governing the
elasticity of the real contract price with respect to output, is small and statistically insignif-
icant across two of the three estimation approaches in this case, its presence significantly
alters the behavior of the model in response to both technology and monetary policy shocks.
The parameter s determines the distribution of weights placed on past and current contract
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prices and output values in the contracting specification can now be estimated, since allowing
γ to deviate from zero means that contract prices will exhibit dynamic responses in contrast
to when output is excluded from contract negotiations. The value of s is estimated to be
between 0.04 and 0.07 for the cases when policy responses are used in the estimation strategy,
although neither of the estimates are significant, and is pushed to its upper limit of 1/6 for
the case when only technology responses are used to estimate the model.
Figure 5.2(a) illustrates that when contracts are allowed to react to deviations in output,
the model responses to a policy shock match the empirical responses more closely than do
the model responses in the case when contracts are not allowed to react to deviations of
output. The improvement comes because when γ > 0, following an unexpected rise in the
interest rates, output falls and pulls down the negotiated real contract prices for the current
and later periods. This pulls down the real wage and thus the counterfactual increase in
the real wage that existed when output was not included in the contracting equation under
Case 1 disappears. The resulting severe decrease in hours and output observed in Case 1
also disappear. Prices are no longer as flexible with estimated values of θp and δp higher
for the estimation approach using both shocks (θp = 0.915, δp = 0.835) and the estimation
approach using policy shocks only (θp = 0.919, δp = 0.850) than they were under Case 1. The
value of the habit persistence parameter is estimated to be between 0.83 and 0.88 across the
estimation approaches under Case 2, values in line with the estimates from Case 1 and the
versions of the model presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
The estimation results in the last column of Table 5.1 and the impulse responses displayed
in Figure 5.2(b) reveal that the staggered contracting specification’s responses to a technology
shock are also improved when output is included directly in contracts. Again the value of γ
is insignificant, but its presence dramatically alters the behavior of the model in response to
a technology shock. After the technology shock, output falls relative to trend and because of
the procyclical behavior of contract prices, the currently negotiated contract price falls and
pushes the detrended real wage below its steady state. The log-level of the real wage does
not rise on impact of the shock by as much as it would without output in the contracts, and
the detrended capital falls by more than it would without output in the contracts. Thus the
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increase in capital is less than when output is excluded from contracts. This contributes to a
smaller increase in output in Case 2 than under Case 1 and thus a closer fit of the model with
the data. The results presented here provide strong evidence for the inclusion of output in
the contract price equation of the staggered contracting version of the model. The J statistics
reported in the last three columns of Table 5.1 are the lowest among any versions of the model,
with the exception of the value for the technology shock only case, which is slightly higher
than in the sticky wage case. This indicates that the staggered contracting model offers an
improvement in fit over the baseline sticky wage model, a result discussed further in Chapter
7.
5.6.3 Case 3: Contracts without Technology Indexation and γ = 0
The final case analyzed involves contracts that are not indexed to technology but that do
allow the real contract price to vary directly with output.9 The parameter estimates for this
case are reported in Table 5.2 and the impulse responses are displayed in Figure 5.3. The
policy shock responses presented in Figure 5.3(a) and the estimates of the parameters when
only the policy responses are used to estimate the model are the same as in Case 2. This
is because the only difference between the two contracting equations (5.47) and (5.48) is the
presence of leads and lags of the technology shock in the latter.10 Clearly, this difference
plays no role in the transmission of the policy shock. The obvious result is that the staggered
contracting model’s responses to a policy shock is invariant to whether or not contract prices
are indexed to the level of technology.
The parameter estimates when technology responses are used to fit the model to the data
are similar to Case 2. The major differences when only the technology responses are used
and when both the technology and policy responses are used to generate parameter estimates
from Case 2 involves the values of the weight on output in contract negotiations γ and
9I also analyzed the case where contracts are not indexed to technology and are not allowed to respond
directly to deviations in output. This model significantly under-performed the versions presented in Cases 1 –
3 and so is ignored here.
10The leads actually play no role at all, since the technology shock follows a serially uncorrelated white noise
process with a zero expectation.
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the parameter measuring the distribution of weights on other contracts s in the contracting
specification. The estimates of γ are higher compared with Case 2. The values of s under
both shocks and the value under only technology shocks are both driven to zero, indicating
that relatively less weight is put on more recently negotiated contract prices in the current
case. This implies that less weight should be placed on the more recent lags of the technology
shocks in equation (5.48). The responses to the technology shock displayed in Figure 5.3(b)
reveal that the fit deteriorates when contracts are not indexed to technology as compared to
Case 2 when they are indexed to technology. The higher J values compared with those of Case
2 when technology shocks are used in the estimation approach support the conclusion that
the preferred version of the staggered contracting model involves technology-indexed contracts
that directly incorporate a procylical component to respond to deviations of detrended output
from its steady state.
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5.7 Appendix
This appendix presents the derivations of equations (5.48) and (5.49) and the coefficients
given in (5.50)–(5.55) for the case when contracts are fixed for four quarters. Detrending
equation (5.45) by dividing both sides by Zt yields
Vt
Zt
=
(
1
Zt
) 3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Pt−i
)fi
(5.57)
=
(
1
Zt
)(f0+f1+f2+f3) 3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Pt−i
)fi
=
3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Pt−i
)fi ( 1
Zt
)fi
=
3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Pt−i
)fi ( 1
Zt
)fi (Zt−i
Zt−i
)fi
=
3∏
i=0
(
Xt−i
Zt−iPt−i
)fi (Zt−i
Zt
)fi
=
3∏
i=0
(xt−i)fi
((
e−γz
)i
e−
Pi−1
j=0 
z
t−j
)fi
=
3∏
i=0
(
xt−i
(
e−γz
)i
e−
Pi−1
j=0 
z
t−j
)fi
.
Thus the detrended value of Vt can be expressed as vt = VtZt , and the detrended value of
the real contract price can be expressed as xt = XtZtPt . Next, equation (5.46) can be detrended
as follows:
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Xt
ZtPt
=
(
1
Zt
) 3∏
i=0
(EtVt+i)fiyt+iγfi (5.58)
=
(
1
Zt
)(f0+f1+f2+f3) 3∏
i=0
Et(Vt+i)fiyt+iγfi
=
3∏
i=0
(EtVt+i)fi
(
1
Zt
)fi
yt+i
γfi
=
3∏
i=0
(EtVt+i)fi
(
1
Zt
)fi (EtZt+i
EtZt+i
)fi
yt+i
γfi
=
3∏
i=0
(
EtVt+i
EtZt+i
)fi (EtZt+i
Zt
)fi
yt+i
γfi
=
3∏
i=0
(Etvt+i)
fi
(
(eγz)i e
Pi−1
j=0 
z
t+j
)fi
yt+i
γfi
=
3∏
i=0
(
Etvt+i (eγz)
i e
Pi−1
j=0 
z
t+j
)fi
yt+i
γfi
Substituting (5.57) into (5.58) and combining like terms results in the following expression:
x
(1−f0f0−f1f1−f2f2−f3f3)
t = x
(f0f1+f1f2+f2f3)
t−1 x
(f0f2+f1f3)
t−2 x
(f0f3)
t−3 (5.59)
× Etx(f0f1+f1f2+f2f3)t+1 Etx(f0f2+f1f3)t+2 Etx(f0f3)t+3
× e(1−f0−f1−f2−f3)(γf1+2γf2+3γf3)e−((f0(f1+f2+f3)+f1(f2+f3)+f2f3))zt
× e−(f0(f2+f3)+f2f3)zt−1e−(f0f3)zt−2e−(f0f3)zt−2
× e(f1(1−f1−f2−f3)+f2(1−f2−f3)+f3(1−f3))zt+1
× e(f2(1−f1−f2−f3)+f3(1−f2−f3))zt+2
× e(f3(1−f1−f2−f3))zt+3
× yt(γf0)Etyt+1(γf1)Etyt+2(γf2)Etyt+3(γf3)
Taking the log-deviations of the above equation around the steady state and solving for
xˆt results in equation (5.48). To derive (5.49), detrend (5.44) as follows:
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(
Wt
ZtPt
) 1
λw
=
(
Xt
ZtPt
) 1
λw
+
(
Xt−1
Zt−1Pt−1
Zt−1
Zt
Pt−1
Pt
) 1
λw
(5.60)
+
(
Xt−2
Zt−2Pt−2
Zt−2
Zt
Pt−2
Pt
) 1
λw
+
(
Xt−3
Zt−3Pt−1
Zt−3
Zt
Pt−3
Pt
) 1
λw
The above equation can be rewritten as
w
1
λw
t = x
1
λw
t +
(
xt−1(eγzΠt)−1
) 1
λw (5.61)
+
(
xt−2(e2γzΠtΠt−1)−1
) 1
λw +
(
xt−3(e3γzΠtΠt−1Πt−2)−1
) 1
λw .
Taking the log-linear approximation around the steady state yields equation (5.44).
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Table 5.1: Parameter Estimates – Staggered Contracting Model with Technology-
Indexation
Contracts without Output Contracts with Output
Shock Shock
Param Pol, Tech Pol Tech Pol, Tech Pol Tech
θp 0.624 0.363 0.893 0.915 0.919 0.741
(0.031) (1.123) (0.139) (0.012) (0.007) (0.029)
δp 0.007 0.703 0.500 0.835 0.850 0.000
(0.234) (2.735) (1.279) (0.068) (0.062) (–)
h 0.780 0.776 0.820 0.839 0.819 0.880
(0.000) (0.023) (0.026) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
s – – – 0.074 0.042 0.167
(–) (–) (–) (0.243) (0.125) (–)
Φ 0.000 0.000 0.000 – – –
(–) (–) (–) (–) (–) (–)
γ – – – 0.030 0.033 0.043
(–) (–) (–) (0.028) (0.015) (0.144)
J 2004.18 1714.65 285.49 267.81 116.52 134.46
J with ut 2149.92 1672.44 319.37 413.55 228.38 168.34
Note: Columns two through four provide parameter estimates and standard errors (in paren-
theses) for the staggered contracting version of the model with technology indexation when
contracts do not contain an explicit output term, while columns five through seven pro-
vide parameter estimates and standard errors for the staggered contracting version of the
model with technology indexation when contracts do contain an explicit output term. The
columns specify which shocks are used to fit the model to the data when generating para-
meter estimates. The second-to-last row provides the measure of goodness-of-fit expressed
in equation (3.57) of the estimated model when unemployment responses are not used in
fitting the model to the data, while the last row provides the goodness-of-fit measure when
unemployment responses are used to fit the model to the data. Entries of – denote values
that were not estimated. A parameter estimate with a standard error value reported as –
indicates that the parameter estimate was driven to a lower or upper bound.
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Table 5.2: Parameter Estimates – Staggered Contracting Model without Technology-
Indexation
Contracts with Output
Shock
Param Pol, Tech Pol Tech
θp 0.913 0.919 0.763
(0.015) (0.007) (0.015)
δp 0.817 0.850 0.000
(0.086) (0.062) (–)
h 0.847 0.819 0.865
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
s 0.000 0.042 0.000
(–) (0.125) (–)
γ 0.064 0.033 0.223
(0.011) (0.015) (0.100)
J 419.24 116.52 196.36
J with ut 564.98 228.38 230.24
Note: Columns two through four provide parameter
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for the
staggered contracting version of the model without
technology indexation when contracts contain an ex-
plicit output term. The columns specify which shocks
are used to fit the model to the data when generating
parameter estimates. The second-to-last row provides
the measure of goodness-of-fit expressed in equation
(3.57) of the estimated model when unemployment
responses are not used in fitting the model to the
data, while the last row provides the goodness-of-fit
measure when unemployment responses are used to
fit the model to the data. Entries of – denote val-
ues that were not estimated. A parameter estimate
with a standard error value reported as – indicates
that the parameter estimate was driven to a lower or
upper bound.
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Figure 5.1: Staggered Contracting Model Impulse Responses – Technology Indexation
No Output in Contracts
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 5.2: Staggered Contracting Model Impulse Responses – Technology Indexation
Output in Contracts
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 5.3: Staggered Contracting Model Impulse Responses – No Technology Indexation
Output in Contracts
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Chapter 6
Search and Bargaining
A major criticism of the Fuhrer and Moore specification of the previous chapter involves
the somewhat arbitrary nature of the staggered contracting mechanism that drives its results.
The relative contracting framework makes no appeal to any underlying optimization problem
faced by the parties involved in wage negotiations, and thus is not explicitly microfounded.
The bargaining approach analyzed in this section follows the work of Andolfatto (1996),
Pissarides (2000), Cheron and Langot (2000) and Trigari (2004) and offers a non-Walrasian
labor market rigidity that is based on optimizing behavior by firms and workers within the
context of a matching model where firms post vacancies and workers search for jobs. The
search and bargaining specification introduces another channel to explain the transmission of
policy and technology shocks by allowing labor to change not only at the intensive margin
(number of hours per worker) like the other labor market frameworks analyzed in the previous
three chapters, but also at the extensive margin (number of workers employed).
Andolfatto (1996) introduces the search and bargaining specification into an otherwise
standard dynamic real business cycle (RBC) framework and shows that this friction helps
to explain several features of the data better than the standard RBC model without search
and bargaining. For instance, by incorporating search and bargaining, the model can match
the empirical facts that the labor input fluctuates more than the real wage and that most
of the change in aggregate hours comes at the extensive margin. Cheron and Langot (2000)
extend the work of Andolfatto by incorporating search and bargaining frictions into a dynamic
business cycle model with price rigidities to provide a better theoretical motivation for the
empirical presence of the Phillips and Beveridge curves. Cheron and Langot model the firm
as a monopolistically competitive supplier of an intermediate good that must decide how
many vacancies to post and what price to charge as well as the amount of capital to hire.
Trigari (2004) models the hiring firm as separate from the pricing firm and presents the Nash
bargaining and right-to-manage versions of the labor market as preferred alternatives to a
flexible wage specification similar to the one analyzed in Chapter, 3 since the bargaining
frameworks can explain equilibrium unemployment and fluctuations in unemployment, while
the flexible wage specification cannot.
I extend the analysis of Trigari by nesting this bargaining framework for the first time
in an environment including capital markets and technology growth. The addition of capital
markets to the Trigari model significantly alters its results. I also analyze the impulse re-
sponses of the search and bargaining model for the first time to a permanent increase in the
level of technology. Other examples in the literature have incorporated the Trigari framework,
including Walsh (2005) and Christoffel and Linzert (2005), but neither of these has attempted
the extensions proposed here nor to analyze the estimation of model parameters by fitting
the model to the data. I show here that the Trigari model’s underlying assumptions prevent
the identification of vacancies, a key variable driving the results of the search model.
6.1 Hiring Firms and Labor Market
In the Trigari labor market, hiring firms post vacancies while unemployed workers search
for jobs. The number of vacancies is given by V˜t, and the number of unemployed workers is
given by U˜t. Each firm in the labor market has one vacancy that can either be filled or left
vacant. The number of matches M˜t is an increasing function of the number of vacancies and
the number of unemployed workers as follows:
M˜t = σmU˜σt V˜
1−σ
t (6.1)
Here 0 < σm < 1 is a parameter measuring the efficiency of the matching process, and
0 < σ < 1 is a parameter measuring the relative input of workers and vacancies in the
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matching function. The probability that a labor-hiring firm will be able to fill its open
vacancy is given by
q˜t =
M˜t
V˜t
. (6.2)
Correspondingly, the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job is given by
s˜t =
M˜t
U˜t
. (6.3)
If a match occurs, each of the hiring firms produces according to the production function1
Yt = f(Lt,Kt) = Z1−αt L
1−α
t K
α
t . (6.4)
In this model, if a match occurs at time t, production occurs at time t+ 1. There is also
an exogenous rate of job separation each period, so that employment N˜t behaves according
to
N˜t = (1− ρn)N˜t−1 + M˜t−1, (6.5)
where ρn is the exogenous probability that an employed worker will lose his job.
If the labor force is normalized to unity, the number of unemployed workers at the begin-
ning of time t is given as2
U˜t = 1− N˜t. (6.6)
With the labor force at unity, N˜t and U˜t represent the fractions of the labor force that are
1Here the fixed cost parameter Φ is set to zero, since as shown below the variable portion of profits in the
steady state is zero. This value of Φ ensures the nonnegativity of profits in the steady state for the hiring firm.
2Trigari claims that unemployment at the end of the period can be expressed as U˜t = 1 − (1 − ρn)N˜t
and uses this measure at the end of time t as the unemployment series. Trigari explains that the end-of-
period unemployment includes those who spent the period searching for a job (1 − N˜t) and those who were
separated from their jobs (ρnN˜t). I use the measure of unemployment expressed in equation (6.6), since its
steady state value implies that 1 = U˜ + N˜ , while the steady state of the equation used by Trigari implies that
U˜ = 1− N˜ + ρnN˜ . This suggests that there are an extra ρnN˜ workers in the steady state and also contradicts
Trigari’s interpretation of U˜t and N˜t as shares of the unit labor force. The estimation results, however, seem
fairly insensitive to the way unemployment is calculated, which should be true when ρn is small as is the case
with the calibrated value used by Trigari (2004) and in this chapter (ρn = 0.08).
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employed and unemployed, respectively.
The Bellman equation, in units of current consumption, characterizing the value of a filled
job to a hiring firm at time t is given as
J˜t = x˜tf(Lt,Kt)− Wt
Pt
Lt − R
k
t
Pt
Kt + Etβt+1(1− ρn)J˜t+1. (6.7)
The hiring firm, however, chooses capital optimally and ends up with the first-order condition
Rkt
Pt
= x˜tfK(Lt,Kt) = α
f(Lt,Kt)
Kt
. When hiring labor, the firm takes this information into
account, and the Bellman equation for the hiring firm becomes:
J˜t = (1− α)x˜tf(Lt,Kt)− Wt
Pt
Lt + Etβt+1(1− ρn)J˜t+1 (6.8)
The hiring firm with a filled vacancy sells its output at the relative price Ph,t, and the
price of the consumption good is given by Pt, so in real terms its output is valued at x˜t =
Ph,t
Pt
.
The first two terms in J˜t represent the real value of the firm’s current production less its real
costs of producing, which includes hiring labor and capital. The last term represents the
discounted value of continuing the match until next period, which will occur with probability
1− ρn.3
The Bellman equation characterizing the value of an open vacancy to a hiring firm at time
t, in terms of current consumption, is given as
F˜t = − κ˜Ξt + Etβt+1[q˜t(1− ρn)J˜t+1 + (1− q˜t)F˜t+1], (6.9)
where −κ˜ is the utility cost of leaving the vacancy unfilled. Thus, the first term represents
the disutility in terms of current consumption goods of leaving the job vacant, while the last
term represents the discounted value the firm faces next period. With probability q˜t the firm
could get its vacancy filled (and thus have the vacancy terminated), which as explained above,
only has an expected future value of Et((1− ρn)J˜t+1). The firm could also have the vacancy
remain unfilled with probability 1− q˜t and face the value of still having a vacancy next period.
3The hiring firm discounts the value of the job at the same kernel used by households to discount future
claims, with βt+i = β
i Ξt+i
Ξt
expressed in units of current consumption.
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In the version of the framework Trigari (2004) presents, firms experience no barriers
against entry into the labor market to create new vacancies. Thus firms will create vacancies
as long as the value of F˜t is greater than zero. As the number of vacancies increases the
probability that any vacancy is filled q˜t falls. This pushes down F˜t, and in equilibrium F˜t is
driven to zero. Thus the equilibrium condition associated with vacancy postings by the firms
should be
κ˜
Ξt
= Etβt+1q˜t(1− ρn)J˜t+1. (6.10)
As stated earlier, Trigari’s model relies critically on the assumption of decreasing returns
to scale. In the original formulation of this model, the production function is f(Lt) = ZtLαt ,
with 0 < α < 1. Thus the firm has opportunity for steady state profit. If the firm has no
opportunity for steady state profit, as will arise under the constant returns to scale technology
of equation (6.4) and the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for the hiring firms’
goods, then equation (6.10) can no longer be used to identify q˜t in a linearized model as will
be discussed below.
6.2 Intermediate Goods Firm
The intermediate goods firms in this version of the model behave much more simply than
those in the baseline specification, acting only as middle men by buying inputs from the
labor-hiring firms and reselling them to the final goods firm. The intermediate goods firms,
however, still get to set prices in a staggered, monopolistically competitive Calvo fashion,
solving an intertemporal optimization problem similar to the one solved in the baseline Calvo
model of Chapter 3.
Again MCt is constant across intermediate firms, but is now given as the relative price of
the hiring firm’s output:
MCt =
Ph,t
Pt
= x˜t (6.11)
Thus nominal marginal cost can be described as MCnt = Ph,t, and firms resetting prices solve
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the same type of Calvo problem in the standard New Keynesian model expressed in equations
(3.12)–(3.14).
6.3 Bargaining Household
Each household still solves the basic problem expressed in (3.17) and (3.18), but since in
equilibrium, some members will be unemployed, there arises the possibility of unequal distri-
bution of income and thus unequal consumption and savings across households. To ensure
that the labor market conditions of a household are separate from its other choices, the house-
hold is modeled as a family of individuals over the unit interval. Since complete markets are
assumed, individuals pool and smooth consumption across themselves. Thus, households face
the representative utility function below with identical first-order conditions for consumption,
bonds and real money balances as in the other versions of the model presented in Chapters
3–5:
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βi
[
ln(Ct+i(j)− hCt+i−1(j)) + am1− γm
Mt(j)
PtZt
(1−γm)
− G˜t(j)
]}
(6.12)
Here G˜t represents the sum of the disutility of labor for all members of the household.4 The
Bellman equation for a worker that is employed at time t, in terms of current consumption,
is given as5
H˜t =
Wt
Pt
Lt − anL
1+γn
t
(1 + γn)Ξt
+ Etβt+1[(1− ρn)H˜t+1 + ρnD˜t+1] (6.13)
=
Wt
Pt
Lt − anL
1+γn
t
(1 + γn)Ξt
+ Etβt+1[(1− ρn)(H˜t+1 − D˜t+1) + D˜t+1].
4Since hours and wages are determined by a bargaining framework outside of the household’s direct control,
the form of G˜t does not need to be explicitly specified.
5I follow the convention in this section that the supply of hours equals the demand for hours Lt. Thus, Lt
is both hours supplied and hours demanded.
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The benefit of being an employed worker is the payment WtPt Lt and the cost is the foregone
leisure when working given by anL
1+γn
t
(1+γn)Ξt
. The expected value next period of currently being
employed is the probability of still being employed (1−ρn) times the value of being employed
next period H˜t+1 plus the probability of becoming unemployed ρn times the value of being
unemployed next period D˜t+1. The Bellman equation for an unemployed worker is given as
D˜t = bZt + Etβt+1[s˜t(1− ρn)H˜t+1 + (s˜tρn + (1− s˜t))D˜t+1] (6.14)
= bZt + Etβt+1[s˜t(1− ρn)(H˜t+1 − D˜t+1) + D˜t+1].
The current value of being unemployed is given by bZt, where b is the unemployment benefit
and is multiplied by Zt to give the benefit term in D˜t the same trend as the rest of the value
function. The expected value next period of being unemployed this period is the probability
that a match is formed and not ended s˜t(1 − ρn) times the value of being employed next
period H˜t+1 plus the probability of being unemployed (s˜tρn + (1 − s˜t)) times the value of
being unemployed next period D˜t+1.6
6.4 Nash Bargaining
The representative hiring firm and the representative bargaining household that are en-
gaged in a match choose the real wage and hours each period of the match to maximize the
joint surplus arising from employment, given as
(H˜t − D˜t)χ(J˜t − F˜t)1−χ. (6.15)
The parameter χ reflects the relative bargaining power of the worker and takes on values
between zero and one. As χ approaches zero, the relative bargaining power of the hiring firm
increases, and as χ approaches one, the relative bargaining power of the worker increases.
6The probability of being unemployed in this case comes from two sources. First, an individual can find a
match and then become separated from the match before beginning work with probability (s˜tρn), and second,
an individual can fail to find a match with probability (1− s˜t).
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Replacing H˜t and J˜t with (6.13) and (6.7), respectively, imposing the equilibrium condition
that F˜t = 0, and taking the first order condition with respect to WtPt , results in the following
condition:
χJ˜t = (1− χ)(H˜t − D˜t) (6.16)
Plugging in the definition of J˜t, H˜t and D˜t and after some manipulation, the following
expression results for the real wage:
Wt
Pt
= χ
(
(1− α)x˜tZ1−αt Kαt L−αt +
κ˜V˜t
LtΞtU˜t
)
+ (1− χ)
(
anL
γn
t
(1 + γn)Ξt
+
bZt
Lt
)
(6.17)
Firms and workers must also bargain over hours, which are chosen in the same way as the
real wage by maximization of the joint surplus (6.15), resulting in an equivalence between
marginal productivity and the marginal rate of substitution:
x˜tZ
1−α
t K
α
t L
−α
t =
anL
γn
t
Ξt
(6.18)
Trigari assumes that in the steady state for the model the real wage equals the marginal
rate of substitution (MRSt). Since the current version of the model contains growth, the
analog to this steady state can be found by detrending WtPt and MRSt by Zt as in (3.34), so
that in the steady state WtZtPt =
MRSt
Zt
. Combining this with (6.18) implies that
wr = (1− α)x˜kαL−α = anL
γn
ξ
(6.19)
Furthermore, detrending (6.10), the condition that firms will continue to post vacancies
until the value of doing so is zero and evaluating it at the steady state yields
κ˜
ξ
= βq˜(1− ρn)
(
(1− α)x˜kαL1−α − wrL+ κ˜ξ) . (6.20)
Combining (6.20) with (6.19) results in the condition that κ˜ξ = q˜(1−ρn)β κ˜ξ . A condition that
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can only be satisfied in general if κ˜ = 0. This means that in the steady state, the detrended
version of (6.17) becomes
wr = χ
(
(1− α)x˜kαL−α)+ (1− χ)( anLγn
(1 + γn)ξ
+
b
L
)
. (6.21)
In order for (6.18) and (6.19) to hold, it again must be true that bL =
γn
1+γn
mrs, where
mrs = anL
γn
ξ is the detrended steady state marginal rate of substitution. Thus, Combining
(6.18) with (6.17) yields the condition:
Wt
Pt
=
(
1 + χγn
1 + γn
)
anL
γn
t
Ξt
+
(1− χ)b
Lt
(6.22)
6.5 Right-to-Manage Framework
Trigari (2004) also analyzes another bargaining framework in which the surplus is allocated
using the real wage but with firms reserving the right to manage the amount of labor hours
they hire. In this case, profit maximization dictates that firms hire until the real wage equals
the marginal product of labor in terms of the output good, and hours are chosen to satisfy
the following:
Wt
Pt
= x˜t(1− α)Z1−αt Kαt L−αt (6.23)
Since profits will be zero in this case, the no-vacancy condition given by (6.10), can only
be satisfied by κ˜ = 0. In other words, if firms are to always earn zero profit, then it must be
the case that the utility cost of keeping a vacancy open κ˜ must also be zero, just as it was in
the Nash bargaining model.
In Trigari’s original work, the firm and worker again choose the wage by maximizing the
joint surplus from the hire given by (6.15). A problem arises, however, since with no profit, J˜t
is zero and so too is the joint surplus. Thus, no matter how the wage is set, the joint surplus
is zero. Here, I assume that the firm now not only manages hours, but also sets the wage.
The firm, in this case, will set the wage so that it is as low as possible, while still inducing
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participation from the worker. In order for the worker to participate, H˜t must be greater
than or equal to D˜t. Thus the firm sets the wage so that7
H˜t = D˜t. (6.24)
Plugging in the definitions of H˜t and D˜t yields
Wt
Pt
=
anL
γn
t
(1 + γn)Ξt
+
bZt
Lt
. (6.25)
Detrending (6.26) and evaluating it at the steady state results in the equation
wr =
anL
γn
(1 + γn)ξ
+
b
L
. (6.26)
In order for wr = mrs as in the steady state of the Nash bargaining model, it must be
true that bL =
γn
1+γn
mrs.
6.6 Log-Linearized Model
The Nash bargaining and right-to-manage versions of the labor market both contain equa-
tions (3.36), (3.38)–(3.45), (3.47) and (3.49)–(3.53) in addition to the equations below:
Marginal Cost
mˆct = ˆ˜xt (6.27)
Real Rental Rate
rˆkt = ˆ˜xt + (1− α)(Lˆt − kˆt) (6.28)
7If instead the joint surplus was allocated by maximizing (6.15) and initially ignoring the fact that J˜t = 0,
the first order condition would be χJ˜tδ
w
t = (1 − χ)δft (H˜t − D˜t), where δwt and δft denote the respective net
marginal benefits of an increase in the real wage for the worker and the firm. These values would not matter
for the determination of the wage in this case, however, since J˜t = 0, a result of the hiring firm earning zero
profit. Therefore the first-order condition becomes H˜t = D˜t, a condition identical to (6.24).
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Real Wage – Nash Bargaining
wˆrt = −
(
1 + χγn
1 + γn
)
ξˆt + χγnLˆt (6.29)
Real Wage – Right to Manage
wˆrt = −
(
1
1 + γn
)
ξˆt (6.30)
Hours – Nash Bargaining
ˆ˜xt = (γn + α)Lˆt − ξˆt − αkˆt (6.31)
Hours – Right to Manage
wˆrt = ˆ˜xt + α(kˆt − Lˆt) (6.32)
Aggregate Output
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)Lˆt + ˆ˜Nt (6.33)
Matching Function
ˆ˜Mt = σn
ˆ˜Ut + (1− σn) ˆ˜Vt (6.34)
Vacancy Match Probability
ˆ˜qt =
ˆ˜Mt − ˆ˜Vt (6.35)
Workers Match Probability
ˆ˜st =
ˆ˜Mt − ˆ˜Ut (6.36)
Employment Dynamics
ˆ˜Nt = ρn
ˆ˜Mt−1 + (1− ρn) ˆ˜Nt−1 (6.37)
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Unemployment Dynamics
ˆ˜Ut = −N˜
U˜
ˆ˜Nt (6.38)
Vacancy Postings
As discussed above, in the steady state under constant returns to scale, profits are zero
for both the Nash bargaining and right-to-manage specifications. This means that there is
no condition dictating the amount of vacancy postings. In Trigari’s original framework, if
there is profit potential in excess of the utility cost of posting a vacancy, firms enter until
the probability of filling the vacancy falls so that the value of posting a vacancy is zero in
equilibrium. Here, however, there is no profit in the steady state, consequently the cost of
posting a vacancy must be zero. This also means that the condition that was used to identify
the number of vacancies is lost.
Here, I assume that the vacancies follow a process given by
V˜t = (1− q˜t−1)V˜t−1 + φv,y Yt
Yt−1
(6.39)
Vacancies are assumed to carry over until next period unless they are filled, which happens
with probability q˜t. Thus, (1 − q˜t−1)V˜t−1 vacancies remain unfilled from time t − 1 to time
t. In addition, firms are assumed to increase the amount of vacancies posted as the growth
in output increases. The logic here is that if output grows relative to its current value, more
workers are needed to produce the output and thus more vacancies are posted. The parameter
φv,y ≥ 0 represents the procyclical component of vacancy postings. The log-linearized vacancy
condition is given by
ˆ˜Vt = (1− q˜) ˆ˜Vt−1 − q˜ ˆ˜qt−1 + φ˜v,y(yˆt − yˆt−1 + zt ), (6.40)
where φ˜v,y =
φv,y
V˜
, with V˜ representing the steady state of vacancies.
The vacancy equation suggested here has a somewhat arbitrary relationship with current
macroeconomic conditions compared with Trigari’s original formulation. It is necessary, how-
ever, since the Trigari framework, originally cast in the context of decreasing returns to scale,
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loses a major channel to explain the dynamic movements in the economy when there are
constant returns to scale and vacancies are no longer endogenously identified. This channel is
restored here by the inclusion of the φv,y parameter. When φv,y = 0, equations (6.34)–(6.38)
and (6.40) represent a system of six equations and six unknowns. In this case, the dynamics
describing unemployment are completely exogenous in the sense that they do not respond
to any economic conditions like policy or technology shocks that occur outside of these six
equations. When this procyclical channel is turned off in the vacancy specification, the Tri-
gari frameworks are unable to explain the responses of unemployment to policy shocks and
technology shocks as found in the US data.
6.7 Calibration and Solution
I calibrate the values of σm, ρn, and q˜ at the levels used by Trigari (2004). The value
used for the elasticity of new matches with respect to the number of searchers σm is 0.4, the
value used for the rate of job separation ρn is set at 0.08, and the steady state probability
that a firm fills a posted vacancy q˜ is set at 0.7. The parameter vector to be estimated for
the Trigari frameworks is given by Θcnb for the Nash bargaining version of the model and by
Θcrtm for the right-to-manage version of the model. Each of these parameter vectors include
the parameters from the flexible wage model in addition to φ˜v,y, the parameter governing
the procyclical behavior of vacancy postings. The Nash bargaining model also includes the
additional bargaining parameter χ.
Table 6.1 report the parameter estimates for both bargaining frameworks.8 The estimation
results suggest that the Nash bargaining model requires more price stickiness than the right-
to-manage model, and that in both search and bargaining models, just as in the sticky wage
version of the model in Chapter 3, less price stickiness and price indexation is necessary in
matching the technology responses. Also, for both models across all estimation approaches,
the value of φ˜v,y is nonzero but is insignificant in some cases.
Figures 6.1(a) and 6.2(a) show that in response to a policy shock, both the Nash bargaining
8I do not divide hours by employment as Trigari (2004) does, since the object of comparison across speci-
fications in the current work is per capita hours not hours per worker.
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and right-to-manage models behave similarly to the flexible wage version of the model. Each
has trouble matching the responses of wage inflation and wage growth, with both series
indicating initial responses too large in magnitude to match empirical responses. Thus, the
search and bargaining friction offers no noticeable improvement in fitting the policy responses
of the non-unemployment data to the responses of the model. The similarity in the behavior
of the real wage responses of the search and bargaining frameworks compared with the flexible
wage specification holds in the case of the technology shock for the right-to-manage framework
but not for the Nash bargaining framework. As illustrated in Figures 6.1(b) and 6.2(b), the
real wage response for the right-to-manage version of the model is too large on impact of
the shock to match its empirical counterpart. The Nash bargaining real wage response to
the technology shock, however, improves on the flexible wage response since it offers a more
restrained initial response.
The similarity in the two search and bargaining specifications presented here with the
flexible wage version of the model stems from the similarity in the real wage equation among
these three alternative versions of the model. In the Nash bargaining version of the model, the
real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution, while in the right-to-manage version, the
real wage is given by equation (6.30). If γn = 0, however, however, the right-to-manage, Nash
bargaining and flexible wage equations all coincide. This would amount to a constant marginal
disutility specification for labor, which would mean that the marginal rate of substitution
would be unaffected by the quantity of labor supply. In other words, labor supply would be
perfectly horizontal. Thus, according to the right-to-manage wage equation, firms control the
labor input, and so the wage is unaffected by labor supply concerns.
The Nash bargaining specification’s real wage equation, on the other hand, nests as par-
ticular cases the right-to-manage and flexible wage specifications’ real wage conditions. As
χ moves towards zero, firms gain more bargaining power, and in the limit when χ = 0, the
real wage equation matches up with the right-to-manage case. As χ moves towards unity, the
worker gains more bargaining power, and in the limit when χ = 1, the real wage equals the
marginal rate of substitution, matching up with the flexible wage case.
The results here suggest that introducing the search and bargaining friction into the model
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has little effect on the behavior of wages as compared with the model behavior under the flex-
ible wage specification. If the search and bargaining friction is to have a major impact on the
behavior of the model, then, the effect needs to operate through the treatment of the labor
input, which in this model can come at the intensive (hours) or extensive (employment) mar-
gins. From the perspective of the intensive margin, the right-to-manage and Nash bargaining
specifications offer alternative ways to determine hours as compared with the flexible wage
version of the model. The extensive side of the labor market has effects on the behavior of the
rest of the system through two channels. First, as employment increases relative to its steady
state, production increases according to equation (6.33). Second, changes in unemployment
affect interest rate policy according to the policy rule estimated along with the rest of the
structural VAR in Chapter 2, which responds to current and lagged unemployment.9
The extensive side of the labor market can be completely shut off from the rest of the
economy by setting φv,y to zero. When the procyclical channel of vacancies is cut off in this
way, the intensive channel governs the difference between the search and bargaining models
and the flexible wage version of the model. In this case, the two search and bargaining models
perform similarly or worse than the flexible wage version of the model, indicating that any
significant improvement in fit of the model must come from inclusion of the extensive side of
the labor market. Figure 6.1(b) reveals that the presence of the extensive margin can enhance
model performance for the case of the Nash bargaining framework. Following a technology
shock in this case, unemployment falls due to φ˜v,y estimated to be 0.619 according to Table
6.1. This fall in unemployment, however, induces a contractionary monetary policy response
limiting the immediate increases in the real wage and productivity and also causing inflation
9The VAR and thus the empirical interest rate equation in Chapter 2 is estimated by including unemploy-
ment. The interest rate equation in each of the versions of the model presented in Chapters 3–6 is the same
as the empirically estimated interest rate equation. The frameworks of the previous chapter use this interest
rate equation despite the fact that the response of unemployment in these frameworks is always zero. Thus,
the frameworks in the current chapter, since they can produce an unemployment response are, in a sense,
able to take advantage of the empirically estimated reaction of the interest rate to unemployment. This can
help explain why the responses of inflation in previous chapters are so counterfactually unresponsive, since the
presence of unemployment in the empirically estimated equation for the interest rate takes away weight that
could have been placed elsewhere in the policy rule. Since models are being compared to one another, the
same interest rate equation must be used across models. An alternative approach would be to estimate the
interest rate equation without unemployment and use this interest rate equation across each of the versions
of the theoretical model. This would potentially take away the policy channel advantage of the bargaining
models arising from their abilities to explain unemployment.
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to significantly decline. This suggests that a possible channel to explain part of the fall in
inflation following a technology shock is through a contractionary monetary policy shock in
response to tighter labor market conditions.
6.8 Unemployment
When φ˜v,y rises above zero, vacancies become procylical, and thus the Trigari bargaining
models as explained above are able to create nonzero unemployment responses to technology
and policy shocks. The channel in this case involves vacancies, which rise as output rises
above trend, boosting the chance that a searching worker will find a job and thus lowering
unemployment. This relationship is referred to in the macroeconomic literature as the Bev-
eridge curve. Table 6.2 presents results for the case when the unemployment responses are
included in the responses used to fit the model to the data. The results reported in the table
are close to the results when the unemployment series is excluded from the estimation. In
particular, as discussed above in the example of the response of inflation to a technology
shock, even when the model is not asked to fit the responses of unemployment, the fit of
the model to the data is improved when unemployment is present in the model. Indicating
that the extensive margin offers an important channel to explain macroeconomic dynamics
of variables other than just unemployment.
The responses of unemployment shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 reveal that the vacancy
equation as specified in (6.40) allows for the responses of unemployment to fit reasonably
close with the empirical responses to both technology and policy shocks in both the search
and bargaining frameworks. The key to replicating the behavior of unemployment to these
two shocks hinges on using the growth rate in output in the vacancy equation, since it allows
vacancies to be positively related to the technology shock and can thus explain the decrease in
unemployment after the technology shock. If only the level of output were taken into account,
the policy response of unemployment would be in the right direction, but the response of
unemployment to a technology shock would be in the wrong direction. This is because as Zt
rises following the technology shock, output falls relative to trend, lowering vacancy postings
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and counterfactually increasing unemployment.
The results of this chapter indicate that the search and bargaining model presented offers
some contributions to understanding how labor markets affect the transmission of policy and
technology shocks. It appears from the results here that the extensive margin offers a potential
channel to explain certain features of the US data, like the significantly negative response of
inflation after a technology shock. The search and bargaining versions of the model also do a
good job of matching the responses of unemployment to both policy and technology shocks.
On the other hand, the search and bargaining models do a poor job of matching the behavior
of the real wage and wage inflation in response to policy and technology shocks, and in the
case of matching the empirical policy shock, only marginally outperform the flexible wage
version of the model.
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Table 6.1: Parameter Estimates – Search and Bargaining Models
Nash Bargaining Right-to-Manage
Shock Shock
Param Pol, Tech Pol Tech Pol, Tech Pol Tech
θp 0.901 0.945 0.859 0.868 0.875 0.462
(0.129) (0.097) (0.170) (0.107) (0.124) (0.413)
δp 0.005 0.956 0.000 0.984 0.992 0.525
(0.694) (0.192) (–) (0.253) (0.205) (0.844)
h 0.502 0.577 0.152 0.628 0.656 0.000
(0.695) (0.297) (0.296) (0.200) (0.234) (–)
χ 0.688 0.435 1.000 – – –
(0.341) (0.303) (–) (–) (–) (–)
φ˜v,y 0.619 0.803 0.647 0.267 0.609 0.354
(0.330) (0.432) (0.309) (0.240) (0.397) (0.212)
J 383.14 175.72 133.30 495.21 170.74 233.54
J with ut 426.76 186.21 177.31 532.88 179.29 237.47
Note: Columns two through four provide parameter estimates and standard errors (in
parentheses) for the Nash bargaining version of the model, while columns five through
seven provide parameter estimates and standard errors for the right-to-manage ver-
sion of the model. The columns specify which shocks are used to fit the model to
the data when generating parameter estimates. The second-to-last row provides the
measure of goodness-of-fit expressed in equation (3.57) of the estimated model when
unemployment responses are not used in fitting the model to the data, while the last
row provides the goodness-of-fit measure when unemployment responses are used to
fit the model to the data. Entries of – denote values that were not estimated. A para-
meter estimate with a standard error value reported as – indicates that the parameter
estimate was driven to a lower or upper bound.
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Table 6.2: Parameter Estimates – Unemployment Models
Model
Nash Bargaining Right-to-Manage
Shock Shock
Param P, T P T P, T P T
θp 0.951 0.944 0.839 0.874 0.874 0.441
(0.150) (0.094) (0.319) (0.146) (0.123) (0.730)
δp 0.944 0.966 0.000 0.954 1.000 1.000
(0.331) (0.187) (–) (0.320) (–) (–)
h 0.546 0.609 0.433 0.579 0.658 0.000
(0.382) (0.273) (0.514) (0.318) (0.220) (–)
χ 0.643 0.448 1.000 – – –
(0.437) (0.296) (–) (–) (–) (–)
φ˜v,y 0.467 0.728 0.426 0.361 0.635 0.325
(0.368) (0.386) (0.421) (0.370) (0.379) (0.312)
J 403.57 184.90 155.07 524.14 179.06 236.74
Note: Columns two through four provide parameter estimates and stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) for the Nash bargaining version of the model,
while columns five through seven provide parameter estimates and stan-
dard errors for the right-to-manage version of the model. The columns
specify which shocks are used to fit the model to the data when generat-
ing parameter estimates. The second-to-last row provides the measure of
goodness-of-fit expressed in equation (3.57) of the estimated model when
unemployment responses are not used in fitting the model to the data,
while the last row provides the goodness-of-fit measure when unemploy-
ment responses are used to fit the model to the data. Entries of – denote
values that were not estimated. A parameter estimate with a standard
error value reported as – indicates that the parameter estimate was driven
to a lower or upper bound.
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Figure 6.1: Search Model – Nash Bargaining Impulse Responses
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 6.2: Search Model – Right-to-Manage Impulse Responses
(a) Policy Shock
(b) Technology Shock
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid dotted line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines.
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Figure 6.3: Unemployment Impulse Responses in Nash Bargaining Model
(a) Estimation Excludes Unemployment Responses
(b) Estimation Includes Unemployment Responses
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid marked line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines. The top
two responses are the results of excluding the unemployment responses in fitting the model to the data, while
the bottom two are the result of including the unemployment responses in fitting the model to the data.
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Figure 6.4: Unemployment Impulse Responses in Right-to-Manage Model
(a) Estimation Excludes Unemployment Responses
(b) Estimation Includes Unemployment Responses
Note: The model impulse responses are given by the solid marked line, empirical responses are given by the
solid line, and the empirical one standard deviation confidence bands are given by the dashed lines. The top
two responses are the results of excluding the unemployment responses in fitting the model to the data, while
the bottom two are the result of including the unemployment responses in fitting the model to the data.
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Chapter 7
Model Selection
This chapter summarizes evidence on model selection and performance of the labor mar-
ket frameworks from the preceding four chapters. Here, alternative versions of the model are
compared by the closeness-of-fit to the empirical data measured by the J statistic calculated
as the weighted distance between the model and the data and reported in the last two rows
of Tables 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1 and summarized in Table 7.1. Here, the numbers are looked
at as a numerical optimization routine would look at them. Lower numbers are better indi-
cating a closer fit, with no mention of statistical closeness between models or penalization for
over-parameterization. The version of the model reported for the staggered contracting spec-
ification is the version that contains technology-indexed contracts and output considerations.
It is possible to implement a statistical approach like the one explained by Rivers and
Vuong (1999) to do a more statistically formal model comparison with the minimum distance
estimation approach used in the current work. A necessary ingredient to this procedure,
however, is standard errors for the J statistics. Jorda and Kozicki (2005) explain how the
standard errors can be computed for the optimized minimum value statistic under the case
when the optimal weighting matrix is used. In this case, under the null hypothesis of equality
between empirical and model impulse response functions, the J statistic is distributed as a
chi-squared variable.1 The optimal weighting matrix under Jorda and Kozicki’s approach is
1An alternative approach could involve a bootstrapping approach where the J statistics could be computed
multiple times by feeding in the draws of the empirical impulse responses from the bootstrapping technique
in Chapter 2 into the estimation of (3.57). In this case, each of the empirical draws would take the place of
the data impulse response, the J statistic could be computed multiple times, and a standard error for the J
statistic could be calculated.
the inverse of the covariance matrix of the empirical impulse response functions, analogous to
the optimal weighting matrix in the case of GMM estimation. In this current work, however,
the weighting matrix corresponds to the diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix with the
off-diagonal elements set to zero and matches the weighting matrix used by Christiano et al.
(2001, 2005) and Altig et al. (2002, 2005).2
An alternative approach to model selection could also involve the application of the frame-
work laid out by Hall et al. (2007). In this case an information criteria is calculated from fitting
model impulse responses to empirical impulse responses, a criteria that could potentially be
compared across models. Again, this approach relies on the use of the entire covariance matrix
of the empirical impulse responses.
In terms of model performance by a straightforward comparison of J statistics, the stag-
gered contracting framework is able to fit the model driven responses the closest to the
empirical estimates among the alternative specifications presented here under the case where
the responses exclude unemployment and use both shocks to estimate the parameter vector
as evidenced by the first row of Table 7.1. The staggered contracting version of the model
also outperforms the alternative versions of the model when only the policy shock is used
and the unemployment series is excluded from the estimation routine according to the second
row of Table 7.1. Finally, the third row of Table 7.1 shows the sticky wage version of the
model outperforms the other versions of the model when fitting only the technology shock
and excluding unemployment. In this case, though, the Nash bargaining version performs
nearly as well as the sticky wage version. The closeness of fit for each model for the case
when unemployment responses are included in the minimum distance estimation approach is
reported in the last three rows of Table 7.1. In general, the Trigari models outperform the
other versions of the model in this case, with the Nash bargaining specification providing the
closest fit in response to both shocks simultaneously and in response to the technology shock
by itself. The right-to-manage version of the model provides the closest fit to the data for the
case when only responses to policy shocks are used to estimate the model.
2The Rivers and Vuong (1999) framework can be used in combination with the Jorda and Kozicki (2005)
method of standard error calculation in the current work if the diagonal weighting matrix can be considered
a good approximation of the optimal weighting matrix.
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Table 7.1: J Values Resulting from Minimum Distance Estimation
J Values Not Using Unemployment Responses
Shock FW SW SI SC NB RTM
POL/TECH 534.11 293.74 448.28 267.81 383.14 495.21
POL 320.08 142.67 181.19 116.52 175.72 170.74
TECH 212.29 130.88 212.29 134.46 133.30 233.54
J Values Using Unemployment Responses
Shock FW SW SI SC NB RTM
POL/TECH 679.85 439.48 594.02 413.55 403.57 524.14
POL 431.95 254.53 293.06 228.38 184.90 179.06
TECH 246.17 164.76 246.17 168.34 155.07 236.74
Note: The top portion of the table provides the measure of goodness-of-fit
expressed in equation (3.57) of the estimated model when unemployment re-
sponses are not used in fitting the model to the data, while the bottom portion
provides the goodness-of-fit measure when unemployment responses are used
to fit the model to the data. The column indicates the version of the model
(FW = flexible wage, SW = sticky wage, SI = sticky information, SC = stag-
gered contracting, NB = Nash bargaining, RTM = right to manage), while
the row indicates which shocks are used to fit the model to the data when
generating parameter estimates.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This work compares the dynamic responses of various macroeconomic variables resulting
from alternative specifications of the aggregate labor market. The results of the flexible wage
version of the DSGE model analyzed here indicate that some degree of labor market rigidity
is necessary to capture the movements of the inflation, hours, real wage and wage growth
series in response to both policy and technology shocks. The Calvo sticky wage specification
has recently gained a strong foothold in the macroeconomic literature as the primary labor
market rigidity used in the analysis of DSGE models. The sticky wage version of the model is
able to improve on the performance of the flexible wage version by driving a wedge between
the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution. This sticky wage specification, however,
has some shortcomings. First, it is unclear that simply because an approach like Calvo pricing
works in the intermediate goods market that it will work well or is a good fit for the labor
market. Micro and survey evidence of wage-setting from Taylor (1999) and Blinder and Choi
(1990) do not support the story of households as monopolistically competitive wage-setters.
The Calvo model is also unable to generate equilibrium unemployment or unemployment
responses and, as presented here, has trouble matching the empirical responses of inflation to
a technology shock and, to a lesser degree, the responses of inflation and wages to a policy
shock.
With the shortcomings of the Calvo wage-setting specification in mind, this work presents
a series of alternatives to the sticky wage framework. These include the sticky information
framework (Mankiw and Reis 2001a, 2002), the staggered contracting framework (Fuhrer and
Moore 1995a, 1995b) and search and bargaining frameworks (Trigari 2004). These alternative
rigidities are embedded in a DSGE model that includes capital formation and technology
growth – a first for these labor market specifications – and then parameterized using minimum
distance estimation to match the resulting model impulse responses with the empirical impulse
responses to identified empirical policy and technology shocks.
Analysis of the output from the parameterized models leads to several conclusions. First,
the sticky information framework analyzed here improves on the performance of the flexible
wage version of the model when matching impulse responses to a monetary policy shock,
but cannot improve on the flexible wage version when matching the responses to a long-run
technology shock. The best fit in the case of matching the responses of the sticky informa-
tion version of the model to the empirical responses to a technology shock occurs when the
informational rigidity is driven to zero and the sticky information framework collapses down
to the flexible wage framework. The shortcomings of this version of the model suggest that
the informational rigidity should be made more pervasive.
Second, the relative staggered contracting specification performs well in matching the
empirical responses of a policy shock and a technology shock when output considerations are
included directly into contract negotiations. Also, staggered contracts that implicitly take into
account productivity and technology concerns are empirically preferred. The version of the
staggered contracting framework that includes technology indexation and output in contracts
fits the empirical responses more closely than the sticky wage framework when fitting both
technology and policy responses simultaneously and when fitting policy responses in isolation.
Finally, both the right-to-manage and Nash bargaining specifications, despite being theo-
retically attractive alternatives to the Calvo sticky wage framework, lose some of their ability
to explain labor market behavior and unemployment when extended and nested in a more
general, standard DSGE model. In particular, under constant returns to scale technology the
vacancies in these frameworks are no longer identified. This shortcoming can be remedied by
introducing a procyclical vacancy equation that includes output growth. With this vacancy
equation included, the output from the right-to-manage and Nash bargaining frameworks
reveal that the bargaining aspect of the frameworks does not offer enough nominal wage
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rigidity to match the US data. The search aspect, on the other hand, helps the explanatory
powers of the Trigari frameworks through the inclusion of an extensive margin (number of
workers) in the labor market that affects production and interest rates. When unemployment
responses are included in the estimation approach, the search and bargaining models outper-
form the other versions of the model, since they are able to explain part of the response of
unemployment to policy and technology shocks.
These results suggest that the source of the labor market friction has important impli-
cations for the behavior of aggregate macroeconomic variables and thus for the conduct of
monetary policy. Possible extensions of the current work include further development of the
alternative labor market specifications as well as investigation into how the source of labor
market rigidities affects optimal monetary policy.
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